Order modifying terms of appellant’s visitation rights, affirmed, as custody evaluation was proper in this case though the case originally involved visitation; parties were divorced and consented to joint legal and physical custody of children; appellee filed petition seeking to modify terms of appellant’s visitation; custody evaluator was assigned to case, and her findings were not to be distributed except with court’s permission; appellant called expert witness who admitted to having copy of custody evaluator’s report; trial court granted appellee’s petition to modify appellant’s visitation; trial court did not err in declining to declare a mistrial after guardian ad litem advised court in chambers about statements made by one child, while appellant was not there, since his attorney was present and made no objection at the time, attorney waited until guardian placed evidence on record in matter before objecting, guardian did not introduce unreported evidence in chambers, and appellant failed to support argument that guardian’s statements so prejudiced court that it could not have ruled properly; prohibiting appellant’s expert from testifying about the report did not violate appellant’s due process rights; expert’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not violated; appellant had no standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of expert, and expert consented to the court’s request to view file which contained unauthorized report; appellant properly held in contempt of court for allowing his expert to review the custody evaluator’s report; no error in denying appellant’s motion in limine to exclude from record portions of evaluator’s report that contained the children’s statements; to degree any statements could be considered hearsay, the courts have presumed to have disregarded it.

Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0262 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Trial court’s orders entered in post-divorce litigation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disapproved of therapist to whom mother took child; trial court DID NOT ERROR when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismssed contempt, visitation, and custotdy portions of mother’s petition and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismssed claims, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-9-24 (b); because Mother filed current petition for modification of child support 11 moths after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modification of child support, trial court DID NOT ERROR in dismissing portion of mother’s petition seeking modification of child support, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (K)(2); trial court DID NOT ERROR as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview chid’s thereapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s thereapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owned guardian ad litem because mother was not prevailing party, and no statue required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning share of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order; trial court DID NOT ABUSE its discreton in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiciton to deny mother’s motiuon to set asside ward of attorney’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees did not supplement, amend, lter, or modify that judgment; mother’s application for discretionary review of denial of her motion to set aside award of attorney’s fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) are involved, application for appeal is requiered when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-35(a).

Avren v. GArten, S11A0064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Judgment in parties’ divorce case, PARTIALLY REVERSED, and case REMANDED; final degree internally contradicted each party’s share of their minor child’s uninsured health case expenses, since test of decree required 61-39 percent split and incorporated child support addendum required 50-50 split; trial court erred in ordering husband to maintain minor child’s health insurance, without including that expense in calculating his child support obligation, since husband testified that his monthly heath premium would be $238, OCGA 19-6-15 (b)(6) requires proration of child care and health insurance expenses between parents in arriving at adjusted child support obligation and, under section (b)(7), trial court must modify adjusted child support obligation by factoring amount of health and child care expenses each parent actually pays; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireingwife to pay half of loan balance as of date of divorce decree, rather than date of trial, even though trial court did not enter decree until 155 days after trial, since trial court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, and OCGA 15-6-21(a), which requires rulings on motion within 30 days after hearing in counties with less than 100K inhabitants applies only to motions for new trials, injunctions, demurrers, and all other motion, not to bench trials in divorce actions; trial court had discretion to order sale of parties’ residence and to account for how existing mortgage would be paid until sale; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering husband to continue paying mortgage on marital residence, where he still resided, until he purchases home or it is sold; husband benefited from trial court’s omission of steps requiring pro ration of child care expenses under 19-6-15(b) because trial court order parents to split child care expenses equally and father’s pro rate share of expenses would have been 57&; trial court did not abuse its discretion in its visiation award.

Dupree v. Dupree, S10F0516 (06/07/2010), 10 FCDR 1824

Order granting maternal grandmother visitation rights with her daughter’s two children, pursuant to Georgia’s Grandparent Visitation Statute, AFFIRMED; daughter could not challenge visitation order, since she aided in causing order by moving trial court to enforce earlier visitation agreement and there was no evidence of fraud or mistake; daughter was authorized to file instant appeal, pursuant to OCGA 5-6-34(a)(11); Court declined to dismiss daughter’s appeal and denied grandmother’s motion to sanction daughter for filing frivolous appeal.

Hargett v. Dickey, A10A0762 (05/20/2010), 10 FCDR 1702

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/04/2010).

Order holding wife in contempt of parties’ divorce decree and declaring that wife would now pay 100 percent of costs associated with her supervised child visitation, AFFIRMED; trial court has express authority to modify visitation rights in contempt proceedings and cost in this case were directly associated with wife’s visitation privileges.

Carlson v. Carlson, S08A0704 (07/07/08), 08 FCDR 2286

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/18/2008)

Dismissal of father’s new/amended contempt application concerning mother’s alleged violation of his visitation rights, REVERSED; father had right under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 as amended to directly appeal dismissal of his contempt motion, father’s new contempt motion gave mother adequate notice of nature of his claim and trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without hearing did not afford father due process; mother’s contention that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction was meritless, even though mother had moved out of state, since father’s properly served prior contempt motion was still pending when he served mother with new/amended motion and father’s service of new/amended motion on mother’s attorney of record in prior pending action was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Dennis v. Dennis, A10A0500 (03/10/10), 10 FCDR

From the Fulton County Daily Report, 3/26/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action;  trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting visitation schedule; husband did not present his evidence to trial court, recommending that children have more time with non-custodial parent, nor did trial counsel raise argument at trial; husband’s contention that trial court did not ascertain reason he was earning less than his potential income, REJECTED;  although trial court did not make explicit findings in this regard, it was not required to make written findings and, thus, it cannot be said that trial court did not ascertain reasonableness of husband’s occupational choice.

Bankston v. Lachman, S09F1706 (02/01/2010), 10 FCDR 229.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/12/2010.

Grant of visitation to maternal grandmother VACATED, and case remanded with direction for trial court to determine, using clear and convincing standard, whether grandchildren’s health or welfare would be harmed unless visitation is granted and whether visitation is in children’s best interests; trial court did not make these necessary findings of fact, as required by OCGA § 19-7-3 (c), and appellant only approved of form of final order, not its contents.

Cates v. Jamison, A09A1938 (12/07/09), 09 FCDR 4075

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 12/31/2009.