The Supreme Court partially reversed the order retroactively extinguishing William Branham’s alimony obligation to his former wife Jenny Nicholson f/k/a Branham, holding that the trial court’s order vitiated the finality of the judgment obtained as to each past due installment and was therefore clearly contrary to the rule set forth in Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874 (1992). However, the Court affirmed that portion of the order providing that each party would be responsible for his or her own attorneys’ fees, holding that Nicholson waived her right to challenge the order under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (b), where she acquiesced in the trial court’s ruling, never requested attorneys’ fees and failed to provide any evidence supporting a claim for attorneys’ fees.

Branham v. Branham, S11A1896 (01/09/12)

Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

The Supreme Court partially reversed the final judgment in the parties’ divorce case, holding that the trial court improperly denied the father’s motion for new trial based on the incorporation of a parenting plan providing that the child’s therapist had the authority to determine the termination of supervision of the father’s overnight visitation with the child. Because the provision was a material change in visitation that allowed for an automatic change of the father’s visitation without judicial scrutiny into the child’s best interests, it constituted an invalid self-executing change of visitation that the trial court should not have included in the judgment and divorce decree.

Johnson v. Johnson, S11F1856 (1/09/12)
Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (j), reversed, as floor amount of child support provided in parties’ settlement agreement did not construe clear and express waiver of right of modification; parties’ decision not to include in their agreement well-worn waiver language set forth in Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (1978), or its equivalent, suggested that they did not intend to forbid statutory downward modification of husband’s child support obligation, even below floor amount.

Dean v. Dean, S11A0739 (09/12/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 23, 2011

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award of findings authorized award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Francis-Rolle v. Harvey, A11A0357 (05/05/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 20, 2011

Trial court’s award of primary custody of children to father, AFFIRMED, since fact that trial court read case file – which included testimony previously submitted by affidavit, but not admitted into evidence – did not provide that trial court consdered affidavit as evidence for purposes of final hearing or used information in affidavit in reaching decision.

Carroll v. Carroll, A10A2332 (11/29/10), 10 FCDR 3938.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 12/17 /2010.

Downward modification of child support award as well as modification of visitation and parenting time, AFFIRMED, after father petitioned for modifications of both child custody and child support awards based on his becoming unemployed; trial court DID NOT ERR in failing to make its downward modification of child support in child support, and thus O.C.G.A. § 10-6-15 (j), did not apply to keep child support from accruing; trial court DID NOT ERR in inputing income to father, despite his involuntary unemployment, because evidence showed that he was unemployed for proplonged period of time and did not make significant effort to gain employment; no factual basis supported father’s argument that trial court relied on incorrect estimate of mother’s income, since mother’s financial affidavit included both salary and tips; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to modify downward father’s obligation reguarding child’s medical and dental exprenses because trial court was not required to allocate parties’ share of child’s healthcare expenses at same rate as their share of child support award, and parties did not present evidence on subject to trial court; trial court did not err in failing to address father’s visitation suggestions because it determined that there was no evidence of material change in circumstances warranting medification of current custodial agreement.

Galvin v. Galvin, S10A1104 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3467

From:  Fulton Count Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Denial of plaintiff’s petition for modification in custody and child support, alleging that defendant, who had primary custody of parties’ son, was negligent in his care and deficient in meeting his medical needs, AFFIRMED; trial court DID NOT ERR in declining to strike defendant’s testimony in its entirety on ground that he was guilty of false swearing, because record was completely devoid of any evidence that he acted with manifest purpose to testify falsely.

Denial of mother’s petition seeking modification of custody of parties’ child, AFFIRMED; father’s nolo plea to third degree child crueltry in 2008 neither established as matter of law, nor provided any evidence, that father committed act of criminal creulty toward child and, under O.C.G.A § 17-7-95 (c), trial court lacked authority to even consider fact that father entered plea; after considering evidence and detailed report of guardian ad litem, trial court properly concluded that father had not cruelly treated child such that material change in conditition warranted change of custody.

Vaughn v. Stafford, A10A2166 (10/20/10), 10 FCDR 3409

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/05/2010.

Judgment refusing to modify downward husband’s alimony payments to his former wife, REVERSED; trial court erred in determining that language of parties’ settlement agreement established obligation for payment of lump sum alimony rather than periodic alimony, since provision provided that wife’s death would end husband’s alimony obligation for 180 payments in certain specific amounts; amount of husbands total alimony obligation was made uncertain because of contingency regarding wife’s survival; portion of trial court’s judgment finding lump sum alimony obligation and consequent ruling on merits of husband’s petition for alimony modificaiton REVERSED and case remanded for trial court’s consideration.

SHEPHERD V. COLLINS, s07a1658 (02/11/08), 08 FCDR 414

Fulton County Daily Report, 02/22/2008.

Criminal contempt order requiring Rhode Island resident to pay $5K fine and be imprisoned for 200 days for her failure to comply with terms of temporary modification of parental grandparents’ visitation rights to her two children REVERSED; trial court had jurisdiction over grandparents’ modification action, since initial custody determination complied with OCGA 19-9-61, children’s father still lived in Georgia, and personal jurisdiction over mother was not necessary in order to address requested modification; trial court lacked personal jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) over mother for contempt and personal service of mother outside Georgia was invalid under circumstances;  Court relied on Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (1986), which held that Georgia courts did not have personal jurisdiciton over non-risident mother, who was served outside Georgia, under either now-repealed UCCJEA or long arm statutue, and found the UCCJEA required same result; UCCJEA specifically addresses continuing jurisdiction of cusotdy issues, but not contempt issues and it did not repeal any existing statutory provisions covering divorce, custody, alimony or child support procedures; mother did not admit personal jurisdiciton when she failed to respond to discovery served with complaint, since return of service only showed that she was served with summons and complaint, not discovery; contempt order was not enforceable in Rhode Island pursuant to UCCJEA, since applicable provisions referred to custody determinations and did not includ contempt orders.

Daniels v. Barnes,  A07A1719 (03/04/08), 08 FCDR 795

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008