In this divorce action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment awarding Gay H. Hammond alimony in the amount of $1,250 per month, once her husband’s pension matures, holding that she could not complain of any error in the trial court’s failure to utilize the time rule formula in determining the parties’ interest in the pension, after she induced the alleged error in urging the trial court to evaluate and distribute the pension as alimony. The Court also held that the trial court did not err in evaluating the alimony payment based on the assumption that the husband ceased participation in the pension plan beginning on August 31, 2009, since the parties introduced evidence evaluating the pension as of that date and neither party took steps to obtain and present updated pension values as of the hearing date. Next, some evidence supported the trial court’s valuation of the amount of alimony stemming from the husband’s pension; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the parties’ marital assets; and the trial court did not err in ruling that Hammond would be entitled to claim at least one-half of the mortgage interest deduction in any calendar year, after awarding her the marital residence. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Hammond to indemnify her husband and hold him harmless for the debts, which the trial court ordered her to pay, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Hammond $4,074 in attorneys’ fees. Hunstein, C.J., concurred in Divisions 1, 2, 4 and 5 and in the judgment only.

Hammond v. Hammond, S11F1978, (02/06/12)

Fulton County Daily Report, February 10, 2012

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in the parties’ divorce case, holding that the trial court properly found that the two accounts which the husband established with inherited funds were marital property, since the accounts were transformed to marital property when the husband gave the wife an ownership interest in the property by establishing the accounts in both spouses’ names. Next, the trial court correctly found that the inherited real property was marital property, as the husband directed that the property be deeded to himself and his wife as tenants in common upon inheriting the property. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the husband all of the couple’s interest in an apartment complex, notwithstanding the husband’s initiation of a separate legal action to enforce his interest in the property and his payment of legal fees arising therefrom, where the interests in the apartment complex were bought during the marriage with marital funds, and the wife acquired a separate and distinct interest with the purchase of the property. Finally, the trial judge did not erroneously or improperly state, after the conclusion of the wife’s case-in-chief but before the husband’s presentation of evidence, that he didn’t see why it shouldn’t be decided 50-50 . . . I’ve not heard all the evidence . . . I know you haven’t had [Husband] on direct examination. But I’ve got a very good feel from this case. The record established that the judge made these statements only after the husband testified extensively as an adverse witness and the husband’s counsel thoroughly questioned the wife on cross-examination; the trial judge was only indicating the conclusion he believed the evidence supported thus far; and the prohibition against judicial comment was meant to apply to comments made in front of a jury, not comments made during a bench trial.

Shaw v. Shaw, S11F1586 (01/09/2012)

Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

Trial court’s final judgment of divorce and order holding wife in contempt of temporary order, AFFIRMED;  evidence of parties’ assets as well trial court’s statement that it did not find wife’s testimony credible showed that trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing marital property; trial court did not err in failing to award wife attorneys’ fees because record showed that trial court properly considered relative financial positions of parties; wife’s argument that trial court erred at conclusion of trial in ordering her to pay $76K balance on line of credit she took out on parties’ marital residence because she had no notice that such order would be issued, REJECTED, as trial court informed parties that it was considering such order, and line of credit was significant part of trial; wife’s argument that trial court could not issue such order because order prohibiting-her from taking out line of credit in first place was part of former divorce action which was subsequently dismissed, also rejected; even if trial court erred by referring to prior order, trial court had discretion to issue current order because it heard evidence that wife had been dissipating significant marital asset without notice to husband; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, despite her testimony to contrary, that wife had ability to pay remaining $8K of the 76K ordered by trial court and holding her in contempt for failure to do so; trial court did not err in denying wife’s motion for findings of fact and conclusion of law because wife moved for findings of fact after entry of judgment, and case was not so complex as to make appellate review impossible without specific findings.

Hunter v. Hunter, S10F1792 (03/25/11).

Fulton County Daily Report (April 8, 2011)

Judgement ordering appellant to pay to his ex-wife out-of-pocket sum of $64,044.45, in addition to $33,955.55 sum from his share of net profits from sale of parties’ lake house, PARTIALL REVERSED ; plain language of Paragraph 7 (b) of parties’ post-nuptial agreement stated that appellant was required to reimburse appellee for her separate $98K investment in property solely ‘ “from his 50% share of the net profits,” ‘ not from any separate assets, which he may have, and appellant’s 50% share of net profits was $33,955.55; trial court did not err in ordering that sale proceeds from lake house be used to pay $220,564 line of credit, which parties incurred, since Paragraph 7 (b) defines net profit in relevant part as net of debt on Lake House, with no language limiting term debt to money borrowed to improve house itself; appellee conveyed title to house to bank to secure line of credit, and it is clear that line of credit constituted debt on Lake House with-in post-nuptial agreement’s plain language; appellant’s contention that it would violate Paragraph 16 16(a)(4) of post nuptial agreement – providing generally that debt incurred with express permission of other party – to deduct final line of credit from lake house proceeds, since specific provision will prevail over general one, Paragraph 7 (b) provides that parties’ debt on lake house, which clearly indicates lines of credit secured by house, must be paid off when house is sold, and record showed that appellant was explicity aware of first two lines of credit on lake house, which were used to purchased parties’ martial residence and to fund parties’ juoint business, reguardless of whiter they were made in appellee’s name alone.

Holland v. Holland, S10A1158 (10/04/2010), 10 FCDR 3176

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, October 15, 2010.

$41,500 jury award to wife from proceeds of real property to which appellant held title in case involving wife’s divorce from appellant’s son, REVERSED; trial court ERRED in ruling that property in question was marital asset and denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict, j.n.o.v. and new trial, and in instructing jury regarding equitable division of property, since evidence showed that appellant’s son transferred property to appellant before wife filed for divorce; wife cited no case law in which Court has recognized right to pursue equitable division of property titled in person other than one of spouses, without title to that property first being brought into estate of one of divorcing parties by determination that fraudulent conveyance has occurred; though divorcing spouse, who believes that property transferred away from other spouse is still subject to equitable division, can seek recourse, it is incumbent upon such spouse to pursue those avenues which wife here did not; all of appellant’s remainng enumerations of error were moot.

Armour v. Holcombe, S10F0946 (10/18/2010), 10 FCDR 3333.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/29/2010)

Judgment affirmed in parties’ divorce case; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to classify employer contributions to parties’ pension accounts as martial property and equitably dividing parties’ entire pension benefits; although pension accounts were marital property, evidence authorized finding that division of only parties’ contributions as employees to their pensions would best achieve equitable distribution; trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying wife’s request for attorneys’ fees.

Taylor v. Taylor, S07F1634 (01/28/08), 08 FCDR 207

Fulton County Daily Report, 02/08/2008.

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; absent transcript, evidence presumably supported award to wife of eight parcels of property, which were owned and titled exclusively in her name, and order requiring each party to bear responsibility for his or her own attorneys’ fees.

Dasher v. Dasher, S08F0386 (03/10/08), 08 FCDR 761

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008

Judgment AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce case; trial court DID NOT ERR in awarding wife $200K in lump sum equitable property division, since evidence authorized jury to find that value of marital property exceeded that amount; $600K lump sum alimony award was not excessive, given evidence that husband owned more than $1.6M in property and that his gross monthly income exceeded $16.6K; husband failed to present evidence of his inability to pay property and alimony awards in timely fashion.

Wier v. Wier, S10F0553 (06/28/10), 10 FCDR 2062

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 7/9/2010

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife $50K in lump sum alimony, since evidence supported trial court’s findings regarding husband’s income level; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in determining that home in Tattnall county was wife’s separate property, since husband quitclaimed any interest he had in property to wife prior to their second marriage; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife her retirement account, given trial court’s diligent separation of parties’ assets and overall asset distribution; trial court DID NOT err in calculating child support; evidence of husband’s adulterous acts during parties’ second marriage revived his prior acts during their first marriage as admissible evidence; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife attorneys’ fees; husband had reasonable notice that trial court would consider wife’s contempt claims based on unpaid child support at divorce trial.

Wood v. Wood, S07F1474 (01/08/08), 08 FCDR 66

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (01/25/08)

Judgment on parties’ divorce case, REVERSED, as trial court erred in finding that 10-yer requirement set forth in Uniformed Services Former Souses’ Protection Act, 10 USC § 1408 (d) (2), prevented it from making equitable division of husband’s military retirement benefits; 10-year requirement is simply limitation on direct payment mechanism of that Act and has no bearing on state court’s authority to treat military retirement benefits as divisible marital property; trial court DID NOT manifestly abuse its discretion in denying wife’s motion to supplement appellate record.

Michel v. Michel, S10F0372 (03/29/10), 10 FCDR 1012

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (04/09/2010)