Judgment and final divorce decree arising from parties’ common law marriage, AFFIRMED; Georgia recognizes valid common law marriages from other states, Alabama law applied with respect to common law marriage in this case and evidence, though conflicting, satisfied Alabama criteria for common law marriage; trial court did not err in admitting evidence of parties; conduct after they moved to Gerogia, since their cohabitation and public recognition of their marriage could corroborate other evidence of prior agreement to marry in Alabama; trial court lacked authority to credit appellant for his pre-trial payments of temporary alimony against final award; trial court had authority to enter October 22, 2009 judgment nunc pro tunc to April 7, 2009 and to order appellant’s monthly lump-sum alimony installments to begin on June 1, 2009 and, in any event, appellant benefitted from that order, since his monthly lump-sum payments were $500 less than his monthly temporary alimony payments; Courts had no jurisdiction to consider trial court’s December 1, 2009 contempt order, even if nunc pro tunc to November 19, 2009 provision of that order was proper, since trial court entered that order subsequent to final divorce decree and appellant’s enumeration regaruding contempt order was not redicated on proper and timely appeal.

Norman v. Ault, S10F0874 (06/07/2010), 10 FCDR 1821

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/18/2010)

Dismissal of mother’s petition for change of custody, which included request for child support, REVERSED; trial court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over matter, on basis that child was 18 years old when it held hearing, since mother filed petition when child was still minor and child’s change of legal custody, even for brief period of time prior to his majority, was relevant to question of child support for that period of time; ruling on child support petition after child reached majority did not divest mother of her right to seek award of child support from time peition was filed through remaining period of child’s majoirty;  O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e) provides that custodial parent may seek to extend child support payments for child who has reach age of majority, but has not completed his or her secondary education, as alleged herein; trial court erred in failing to consider mother’s petition for change of custody as petition for child support, since petition included request ofr child support and child support claim was inextricably tried to mother’s peition to gain legal custody as O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 requires.

Wade f/k/a Corinthian v. Corinthian, S08A0363; S08A0363 (05/19/08), 08 FCDR 1694.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (05/30/08)

Order denying father’s petition to legitimate minor and terminating father’s parental rights AFFIRMED, as trial court did not err in denying father’s legitimation petition; father abandoned his opportunity interest to develop relationship with minor, since father did not spend any significant time with minor, after living with minor for one year, and did not pay child support or send cards or letters to minor; father’s argument that trial court wrongfully denied right to counsel during termination of parental rights hearing, REJECTED, because he lacked standing to challenge termination of his rights; father’s contention that juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, REJECTED, because juvenile court has original jurisdiction unless termination petition is filed in connection with formal adoption proceedings.

In the Interest of J.S., A10A0186 (02/12/2010), 10 FCDR 413.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/26/2010.

Judgment of trial court REVERSED in father’s action under OCGA § 19-11-12 for modification of his monthly child support obligation as trial court applied high income deviation from presumptive child support award without making all required findings under OCGA § 19-6-15 (c)(2) – trial court’s order failed to state how application of presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and how upward deviation would serve best interest of children; Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders in child support modification proceedings, which arise from prior divorce or alimony action, regardless of code section under which parties pursued modification, i.e. OCGA § 19-11-12 or 19-6-19, and Court had jurisdiction in this case, because case involved alimony for support of children; striking and redocketing appeal was not necessary to preserve Court’s ultimate jurisdiction in this case.

Spurlock v. Department of Human Resources, S09A1475 (2/15/2010), 10 FCDR 399.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/26/2010.

Dismissal of appellant’s petition to register and enforce 1995 Massachusetts support order against her ex-husband in principal amount of $421,465.84, REVERSED; trial court erred in ruling that order could not be enforced because it was dormant under Georgia law;  appellee’s contention that Massachusetts judgment did not constitute support order under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) on basis that it was contempt order, AFFIRMED, since order included finding that appellee was in contempt of original judgment of divorce, but also established appellee’s arrearages for alimony and statutory interest; Massachusetts judgment was order and judgment for benefit of former spouse providing for arrearages and interest within definition of support order under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-101 (21); Massachusetts 20-year statute of limitation controlled over Georgia’s 7-year dormancy law, since choice of law provisions of UIFSA provide that law of jurisdiction, which issued support order, “governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order;” ‘O.C.G.A. § 19-11-163 (b) provides that, ‘ “[i]n a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies,” ‘ in any event.

Sussman v. Sussman, A09A2289 (12/02/09), 09 FCDR 3930

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 12/18/2009.

Grant of ex-wife’s petition to modify parties’ divorce decree, AFFIRMED, as ex-husband waived any objection to insufficient service of process by personally appearing at hearing on modification petition.

Hudson v. Easterling, A09A2396 (11/19/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (12/11/2009)

GA  juvenile courts lack jurisdiction over the a matter granting temporary custody of a child to a third party, if the deprivation petition is a disguised custody matter filed by the 3^rd party, where a third party specifically asked a juvenile court to remove the child from his mother’s custody and place him in their custody instead.

Also a petition does not a contain valid allegation of present deprivation if it focuses largely upon allegation of past deprivation and potential future deprivation related to mother’s drug use.

In the Interest of C.L.C.;  A09A0798 (08/18/09)

Judges:  Ben Miller / Spalding Juvenile Court; Phipps; Smith; Bernes.

For more information contact: CJ Remboldt