Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTICIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award or findings authorizing award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Final judgment and decree of divorce mandating that husband and wife be equally responsible for any tax liability from wife’s photography business and specifying exact dollar amounts for mimimum gross receipts and profiest to be reflected on wife’s business’s amended tax returns, PARTIALLY REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED; state courts generally are not authorized to impose income tax liability, and any determination in this case that parties were jointly and severally liable was premature because of husband’s contested claim that he qualifies as innocent spouse, trial court erred because it alked accurate and complted documentation and other evidence necessary to calculated such amounts.

Final judgment and decree of divorce, incorporating jury verdict for wife against husband and several third-party plaintiffs, jointly and severally AFFIRMED; because husband and third-party plaintiffs induced and expressly acquiesced in verdict being against them all jointly and severally at jury charge conference, Court refused to entertain their allegation of such error on appeal.

Huling v. Huling, S10F1591 (03/07/11).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 18, 2011.

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011

Final judgement and decree of divorce, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to amke deviation from amount of presumptive child support for couple’s only child based on award of joint physical and legal custody because trial court made express findgs reguarding approporiateness of presumptive child support amount, and because evidence showed that trial court’s failure to deviate did not deprive child or unjustly enrich wife; because evidence showed that husbnad had ingested drugs during child’s lifetime, trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that he be periodically drug tested; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody of child because trial court found both parents to be fit and proper, acknowledging that each parent had strengths and weaknesses, and other evidence, namely  fact that child had good relationship with each parent and each parent had adequate housing for child and could provide for child’s needs, supported award; trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding which parent would have decision-making authority on variety of subjects regarding child; trial court did not err in entering judgement and decree of divorce within 10 months of filing of complaint or in failing to adopt wife’s recollected versionof what transpired during hearing in favor of court reporter’s certified transcript. 

Willis II v. Willis, S10F1357 (01/24/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/4/2011.

Order nuling that Section 3 of settlement agreement relating to divorce decree at issue was unambiguous and that deceased ex-wife intended to grant her employee benefits to her ex-husband, REVERSED; Section 3 of parties’ agreement completely, clearly and unambiguously expressed parties’ intent that beneficiary spouse released any and all interest in other party’s benefits at time of divorce and operated as complete waiver of appellee’s beneficiary designation; even if Section 3 required construction for purose of determining parties’ intent, its third sentence stated that spouse may voluntarily provide benefits to other spouse at any subsequent date, which reinforced parties’ intent that preceeding language was to operate as immediate release of any claim to other’s benefits; there was no affirmative act by ex-wife to constitute attempt to counter or override relinquishment of rights or claims under parties’ agreement; case remanded to trial court for consideration consistent with this opinion and Court noted that any question of appellee’s failure to abide by agreement and any finding of willfulness or contempt was for trial court to decide; ex-wife committed suicide and died intestate five days after divorce.

DeRyke v. Teets, S10A0710 (11/08/2010), 10 FCDR 3587.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/19/2010.

$41,500 jury award to wife from proceeds of real property to which appellant held title in case involving wife’s divorce from appellant’s son, REVERSED; trial court ERRED in ruling that property in question was marital asset and denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict, j.n.o.v. and new trial, and in instructing jury regarding equitable division of property, since evidence showed that appellant’s son transferred property to appellant before wife filed for divorce; wife cited no case law in which Court has recognized right to pursue equitable division of property titled in person other than one of spouses, without title to that property first being brought into estate of one of divorcing parties by determination that fraudulent conveyance has occurred; though divorcing spouse, who believes that property transferred away from other spouse is still subject to equitable division, can seek recourse, it is incumbent upon such spouse to pursue those avenues which wife here did not; all of appellant’s remainng enumerations of error were moot.

Armour v. Holcombe, S10F0946 (10/18/2010), 10 FCDR 3333.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/29/2010)

Judgement AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; absent transcript, evidence presumably supported trial court’s findings that husband was estopped from challenging final order after he availed himself of benefits; Court reiterated “long-standing principle that one who has accepted benefits such as spousal support or equitable division of property under a divorce decree is stopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits,” and, in so doing, disapproved of Grissom v. Grissom, 282 Ga. 267 (2007), which “attempted to create exceptions to estoppel doctrine,” without providing guidance as to how and when such exceptions apply; former spouse can continue to receive temporary alimony without waiving right to appeal; ruling in this case does not invalidate line of cases, which hold that former spouse may collect child support award and still repudiate final judment, since those benefits belong to child.

The judge agreed with Steelcase. He noted that the plaintiff’s public profile page on Facebook showed her smiling happily outside of her home, which was inconsistent with her claim that she was largely confined inside her house in bed. He thus concluded that other parts of her social networking pages might contradict her claims. This may seem a bit harsh. Even someone who is bed-ridden in pain could have a photo taken of him or her outside of the home. On the other hand, that may not be a basis to refuse discovery. It could go more to the weight of the evidence, which could be explained at trial.

The judge also ruled in favor of Steelcase’s discovery requests because “the primary purpose” of social networking sites “is to enable people to share information about how they lead their social lives,” notwithstanding how they “self-set privacy controls” on such sites. This conclusion was buttressed for the judge by the fact that both Facebook and MySpace state explicitly on their sites that they cannot guarantee the privacy of users’ posted content.

So, let there be no mistake, it certainly is possible that communications and materials posted on social networking sites can be fair game for discovery in litigation. Of course, that does not mean that judges always will grant discovery requests in this area. If the relevance of the information sought is too attenuated, then the burden, intrusion, and privacy interests involved might outweigh the probative value of the information. Nevertheless, word to the wise – think twice about what you do or say on social networking sites. Living life out loud can have consequences.

Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.