Trial court’s order holding husband in contempt for refusing to agree to Agreed Domestic Relations Order (ADRO) proposed by his former wife and interpreting their divorce decree to require that they divide husband’s military retirement benefits equally, REVERSED, and case remanded; divorce decree provided that when husband retired from military service, wife would be entitled to receive from his retirmenent benefits such amount as Navy required to be paid to her; after their divorce, both parties learned that Navy did not require retirment benefits be paid to ex-spouses, so wife proposed ADRO, which husband refused to sign, directing that she recieve 50% of martial portionof husband’s benefits; trial court erred in holding husband in contempt because party may not be held in contempt for violation of court order unless order informs him in definate terms as to duties therby imposed on him; trial court’s using contempt proceedings to substantially alter divorce decree, eschewing its plain language, amounted to unauthoized modificaiton of same; letter from husband’s counsel to husband containg wife’s proposed ADRO woul be admissible on remand and not subject to attorney-client privilege because contemporaneiously sent copy of letter to wife.

Morgan v. Morgan, S10A1365 (01/10/11).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  January 21, 2011

Criminal contempt order requiring Rhode Island resident to pay $5K fine and be imprisoned for 200 days for her failure to comply with terms of temporary modification of parental grandparents’ visitation rights to her two children REVERSED; trial court had jurisdiction over grandparents’ modification action, since initial custody determination complied with OCGA 19-9-61, children’s father still lived in Georgia, and personal jurisdiction over mother was not necessary in order to address requested modification; trial court lacked personal jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) over mother for contempt and personal service of mother outside Georgia was invalid under circumstances;  Court relied on Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (1986), which held that Georgia courts did not have personal jurisdiciton over non-risident mother, who was served outside Georgia, under either now-repealed UCCJEA or long arm statutue, and found the UCCJEA required same result; UCCJEA specifically addresses continuing jurisdiction of cusotdy issues, but not contempt issues and it did not repeal any existing statutory provisions covering divorce, custody, alimony or child support procedures; mother did not admit personal jurisdiciton when she failed to respond to discovery served with complaint, since return of service only showed that she was served with summons and complaint, not discovery; contempt order was not enforceable in Rhode Island pursuant to UCCJEA, since applicable provisions referred to custody determinations and did not includ contempt orders.

Daniels v. Barnes,  A07A1719 (03/04/08), 08 FCDR 795

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008

Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife $50K in lump sum alimony, since evidence supported trial court’s findings regarding husband’s income level; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in determining that home in Tattnall county was wife’s separate property, since husband quitclaimed any interest he had in property to wife prior to their second marriage; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife her retirement account, given trial court’s diligent separation of parties’ assets and overall asset distribution; trial court DID NOT err in calculating child support; evidence of husband’s adulterous acts during parties’ second marriage revived his prior acts during their first marriage as admissible evidence; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife attorneys’ fees; husband had reasonable notice that trial court would consider wife’s contempt claims based on unpaid child support at divorce trial.

Wood v. Wood, S07F1474 (01/08/08), 08 FCDR 66

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (01/25/08)

Order holding wife in contempt of parties’ divorce decree and declaring that wife would now pay 100 percent of costs associated with her supervised child visitation, AFFIRMED; trial court has express authority to modify visitation rights in contempt proceedings and cost in this case were directly associated with wife’s visitation privileges.

Carlson v. Carlson, S08A0704 (07/07/08), 08 FCDR 2286

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/18/2008)

Denial of father’s motion to hold mother, father’s ex-wife, in contempt for failing to comply with couple’s 2005 divorce decree, which awarded father legal and primary physical custody of couple’s children, AFFIRMED; grant of mother’s petition for change in custody and award of joint legal an primary physical custody of children to mother, AFFIRMED; consolidation of father’s motion for contempt and mother’s custody petition was not prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23, because custody action was filed as separate action in father’s county, not as responsive pleading; moreover, father cannot complain, because he did not object to consolidation and acquiesced in joint hearing; trial court DID NOT ERR in denying father’s contempt motion, because there was no evidence of willful disobedience of court order; trial court DID NOT ERR in granting mother’s custody petition on grounds that material change of condition affecting welfare of children had occurred since last order, because evidence showed that father failed to provide financially for his children, was uninvolved in their lives and did not enforce original custody order despite being awarded primary physical custody of children.

Saravia v. Mendoza, A10A0391, A10A0392 (03/31/10), 10 FCDR 1173

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, (04/16/2010).

Contempt judgment against appellant, REVERSED, to extent that it required sale of marital residence on basis that appellant did not remove his ex-wife’s name from mortgage within 30 days of remarrying as required in their 2007 divorce decree; trial court permissibly modified divorce decree by requiring appellant to sell marital residence, since such order modified property division provision of divorce decree; decree awarded exclusive ownership of home to appellant and nother in decree explicitly or implicitly required him to see house to satisfy condition that he remove appellee from mortgage; ruling did not mean that trial court was left with no effective means of enforcing divorce decree as trial court cold order appellant to pay appellee significant sum every day until he purges his contempt; evidence supported trial court’s ruling that  appellant willfully disobeyed divorce decree as appellant waited until five days before his weddng to inquire about possible avenues for removing appellee’s name from mortgage and complying with decree’s clear terms.

Darroh v. Willis, S09A1623 (03/01/10), 10 FCDR 518

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 3/12/2010.

Dismissal of appellant’s petition to register and enforce 1995 Massachusetts support order against her ex-husband in principal amount of $421,465.84, REVERSED; trial court erred in ruling that order could not be enforced because it was dormant under Georgia law;  appellee’s contention that Massachusetts judgment did not constitute support order under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) on basis that it was contempt order, AFFIRMED, since order included finding that appellee was in contempt of original judgment of divorce, but also established appellee’s arrearages for alimony and statutory interest; Massachusetts judgment was order and judgment for benefit of former spouse providing for arrearages and interest within definition of support order under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-101 (21); Massachusetts 20-year statute of limitation controlled over Georgia’s 7-year dormancy law, since choice of law provisions of UIFSA provide that law of jurisdiction, which issued support order, “governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order;” ‘O.C.G.A. § 19-11-163 (b) provides that, ‘ “[i]n a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies,” ‘ in any event.

Sussman v. Sussman, A09A2289 (12/02/09), 09 FCDR 3930

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 12/18/2009.

Order incarcerating appellant for contempt arising from her divorce decree, REVERSED, as trial court erred in incarcerating appellant based only upon letter from opposing counsel asserting that she had not complied with terms of trial court’s October 15, 2008 order – incarceration of contumacious party cannot depend upon mere averments of interested party; res judicata did not bar appellant’s appeal, because she appealed order entered subsequent to her prior appeal.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/16/09)

Bauman v. Humphries, A09A1096 (09/29/09), 09 FCDR 3185

Attorneys:  David Cole, Allen W. Bodiford

Judges:  Brian Amero, Henry Superior Court;  Blackburn, Boyle, Adams, Georgia Court of Appeals