Trial court’s orders entered in post-divorce litigation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disapproved of therapist to whom mother took child; trial court DID NOT ERROR when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismssed contempt, visitation, and custotdy portions of mother’s petition and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismssed claims, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-9-24 (b); because Mother filed current petition for modification of child support 11 moths after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modification of child support, trial court DID NOT ERROR in dismissing portion of mother’s petition seeking modification of child support, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (K)(2); trial court DID NOT ERROR as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview chid’s thereapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s thereapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owned guardian ad litem because mother was not prevailing party, and no statue required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning share of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order; trial court DID NOT ABUSE its discreton in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiciton to deny mother’s motiuon to set asside ward of attorney’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees did not supplement, amend, lter, or modify that judgment; mother’s application for discretionary review of denial of her motion to set aside award of attorney’s fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) are involved, application for appeal is requiered when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-35(a).

Avren v. GArten, S11A0064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Revision; judgment revered and case remanded;  Court had jurisdiction over mother’s appeal, even though appeal involved final divorce decree, which included child custody determination, rather than separate child custody order, since mother followed required application procedures for discretionary appeal; trial court had authority to revise custody award in this case beyond term in which trial court entered original custody decree, because father filed his motion for reconsideration within the term of court; however, trial court lacked authority to set aside its original custody determination without determining child’s best interests, regardless of whether mother was living with another man – mother contended that she and man in question did not live together prior to divorce and, since divorce, they had married and, at motion for reconsideration hearing, trial court simply followed its own policy of never awarding custody to parent living with non-relative.

Todd v. Todd, S10A0471 (06/01/2010), 10 FCDR 1754

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/11/2010)

Dismissal of father’s new/amended contempt application concerning mother’s alleged violation of his visitation rights, REVERSED; father had right under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 as amended to directly appeal dismissal of his contempt motion, father’s new contempt motion gave mother adequate notice of nature of his claim and trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without hearing did not afford father due process; mother’s contention that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction was meritless, even though mother had moved out of state, since father’s properly served prior contempt motion was still pending when he served mother with new/amended motion and father’s service of new/amended motion on mother’s attorney of record in prior pending action was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Dennis v. Dennis, A10A0500 (03/10/10), 10 FCDR

From the Fulton County Daily Report, 3/26/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action;  trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting visitation schedule; husband did not present his evidence to trial court, recommending that children have more time with non-custodial parent, nor did trial counsel raise argument at trial; husband’s contention that trial court did not ascertain reason he was earning less than his potential income, REJECTED;  although trial court did not make explicit findings in this regard, it was not required to make written findings and, thus, it cannot be said that trial court did not ascertain reasonableness of husband’s occupational choice.

Bankston v. Lachman, S09F1706 (02/01/2010), 10 FCDR 229.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/12/2010.

Grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss, REVERSED; when trial court considered matters outside pleadings, such as affidavits and testimony from underlying divorce proceedings, it converted motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment and plaintiff was entitled to hearing following his timely request.

Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, A09A1409 (10/30/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (11/30/2009)

GA Grant of wife’s motion to set aside default judgment in parties’ divorce case, AFFIRMED, under right for any reason rule; OCGA 19-5-8 prohibits default judgments in divorce, alimony and child custody actions.

Harold v. Harold, S09A1854 (11/09/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (11/20/2009)