Order ruling that primary custody of parties’ child should be granted to father, affirmed, as trial court did not err in so ruling, based upon mother’s planned move to New York; mother visited New York with child and moved some of child’s belongings to New York, without receiving written authorization from trial court, despite trial court’s order providing that parties were not to remove child from state of Georgia during pendency of case without further written order from trial court; mother’s claim that trial court erred in failing to make written findings of fact regarding material change in circumstances justifying change in custody to father, rejected.

Gallo v. Kofler, S11A0185 (06/13/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, June 24, 2011

Final judgment of divorce, affirmed; trial court did not err by ordering alimony for wife because wife is disabled and husband’s income is sufficient to pay for wife’s health insurance for two years and car payments for one year; evidence supported trial court’s division of marital property; contrary to husband’s contention, trial court did not hold him in contempt of temporary order, because trial court specifically found that his disobedience of temporary order was not willful.

McDonald v. McDonald, S11F0112 (06/13/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, June 24, 2011

Order terminating children’s father’s parental rights, affirmed, as children were deprived, father was unable to provide proper care for children, deprivation was likely to continue and termination was in children’s best interest; after being granted unsupervised visitation with children, father beat one child with belt on child’s buttocks, legs and thighs resulting in child’s hospitalization, father was arrested for child cruelty, and when asked about incident by juvenile court, he exercised Fifth Amendment rights; father had cognitive problems that affected his ability to parent and to implement skills learned in parenting classes and counseling, he had history of anger management problems, engaged in angry outburst in telephone call with evaluating psychologist, admitted to physically disciplining one child in connection with toilet training and displayed anger in regards to one child’s toilet training.

In the Interest of T. P., A11A0304 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Increase in mother’s visitation with her two children, affirmed, as it did not exceed time of custody allowed to father and thus did not amount to de facto change of custody; trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting parties’ communication with each other and attendance at children’s extracurricular activities, as these provisions did not infringe upon father’s rights and were narrowly tailored conditions justified by evidence; father failed to show that trial court’s refusal to admit certain cumulative custody evaluation reports was harmful, or that trial court abused its discretion in considering totality of evidence; denial of father’s motion for supersedeas, affirmed, as trial court did not exceed its authority in exempting visitation provisions of final order from supersedeas even after father filed note of appeal.

Blackmore v. Blackmore, A11A1277; A11A1526 (10/07/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, October 21, 2011

Placement of 2-year-old twins in custody of their uncle and aunt until their 18^th birthday, vacated, and case remanded, as juvenile court’s order did not include finding that referral for termination of parental rights and adoption was not in twins’ best interest, as required for award of long-term custody.

In the Interest of J. C. W., A11A1549 (10/07/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, October 21, 2011

Dismissal of petition seeking custody of plaintiff’s two minor granddaughters, reversed, as trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to state claim; petition gave fair notice that plaintiffs sought custody of children under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1 (b.1) and 19-9-2 based on mother’s alleged murder of father, and these allegations were sufficient to survive motion to dismiss; collateral estoppel did not bar custody action because plaintiff’s prior unsuccessful petition for visitation involved different legal issues; res judicata did not bar custody action because O.C.G.A. § 19-9-45 only applies to issues actually decided in prior action and visitation order related to plaintiffs’ right to visitation, not custody.

Scott v, Scott, A11A1206 (09/20/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, October 7, 2011

Order modifying terms of appellant’s visitation rights, affirmed, as custody evaluation was proper in this case though the case originally involved visitation; parties were divorced and consented to joint legal and physical custody of children; appellee filed petition seeking to modify terms of appellant’s visitation; custody evaluator was assigned to case, and her findings were not to be distributed except with court’s permission; appellant called expert witness who admitted to having copy of custody evaluator’s report; trial court granted appellee’s petition to modify appellant’s visitation; trial court did not err in declining to declare a mistrial after guardian ad litem advised court in chambers about statements made by one child, while appellant was not there, since his attorney was present and made no objection at the time, attorney waited until guardian placed evidence on record in matter before objecting, guardian did not introduce unreported evidence in chambers, and appellant failed to support argument that guardian’s statements so prejudiced court that it could not have ruled properly; prohibiting appellant’s expert from testifying about the report did not violate appellant’s due process rights; expert’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not violated; appellant had no standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of expert, and expert consented to the court’s request to view file which contained unauthorized report; appellant properly held in contempt of court for allowing his expert to review the custody evaluator’s report; no error in denying appellant’s motion in limine to exclude from record portions of evaluator’s report that contained the children’s statements; to degree any statements could be considered hearsay, the courts have presumed to have disregarded it.

Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0262 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Termination of mother’s parental rights to her child, affirmed; clear and convincing evidence authorized juvenile court to rule that child’s deprivation was likely to continue and was likely to harm him; mother gave birth to child in prison, she was without home of her own and unable to provide housing for child, she was unemployed and unable to provide for child’s financial needs, and she suffered from mental health problems for which she allegedly failed to take her medicine; mother also failed to bond with child and did not contact child or DFACS for 16 months that he was in DFACS custody; termination of mother’s parental rights was in child’s best interest, since there was testimony regarding bonding of child with his foster parents, who wished to adopt him, and danger of foster care drift, if permanency was not established.

In the Interest of A. E. S., A11A0692 (07/07/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Dismissal of deprivation complaint, affirmed, as juvenile court acted within discretion in finding that there were no reasonable grounds to find that minor was deprived; minor tested positive twice for Chlamydia but mother and step-father tested negative for disease; mother was cooperating with investigation; minor had not been exposed to disease through penetration, and case manager testified that DFACS did not believe minor was in any immediate danger of harm within home.

In the Interest of J. F., A11A0538 (07/13/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s  therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).

Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).

Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011