Order lifting certain restrictions on visitation rights of mother AFFIRMED, as OCGA 19-9-3(b) authorized trial court to modify visitation rights during contempt proceeding; trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying terms of final judgment to allow mother to resume unsupervised visitation because no evidence showed that mother was present danger to children as she testified that since her visitation rights have been restricted based on her failure to demonstrate that someone had directly witnessed her give urine sample for certain test, she had been seeing physician specializing in addiction medicine and had provided him with urine samples for testing, and no evidence showed that she actually tested positive for drugs or alcohol during prior test or at any subsequent test.

Gildar v. Gildar, A11A0759 (06/01/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, (06/17/2011)

Judgment denying father’s motion to vacate judgment of divorce AFFIRMED, and judgment modifying father’s custody order, AFFIRMED; father’s contention that divorce court lacked jurisdiction based on residency of his children, whom he alleged resided in Ethiopia when divorce was filed and when divorce decree was issued in 2006, was moot, since trial court entered 2010 custody modification and parenting plan order, it was uncontested that children and their mother resided in DeKalb county then and father submitted himself to trial court’s personal jurisdiction when he filed his custody modification pleading and he appeared for hearing on same;  father’s contention that trial court erred in failing to make jurisdictional findings regarding children’s home state in body of 2010 custody modification and parenting plan on basis the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act generally requires such finds, rejected, since there is no such authority where, as here, the trial court did not decline jurisdiction on basis of being inconvenient forum or stay matter because of another custody action in foreign jurisdiction.

Sondium v. Getachew, 11 FCDR 1470

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  May 27, 2011

Trial court’s orders entered in post-divorce litigation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disapproved of therapist to whom mother took child; trial court DID NOT ERROR when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismssed contempt, visitation, and custotdy portions of mother’s petition and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismssed claims, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-9-24 (b); because Mother filed current petition for modification of child support 11 moths after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modification of child support, trial court DID NOT ERROR in dismissing portion of mother’s petition seeking modification of child support, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (K)(2); trial court DID NOT ERROR as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview chid’s thereapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s thereapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owned guardian ad litem because mother was not prevailing party, and no statue required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning share of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order; trial court DID NOT ABUSE its discreton in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiciton to deny mother’s motiuon to set asside ward of attorney’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees did not supplement, amend, lter, or modify that judgment; mother’s application for discretionary review of denial of her motion to set aside award of attorney’s fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) are involved, application for appeal is requiered when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-35(a).

Avren v. GArten, S11A0064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTICIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award or findings authorizing award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Final judgment and decree of divorce mandating that husband and wife be equally responsible for any tax liability from wife’s photography business and specifying exact dollar amounts for mimimum gross receipts and profiest to be reflected on wife’s business’s amended tax returns, PARTIALLY REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED; state courts generally are not authorized to impose income tax liability, and any determination in this case that parties were jointly and severally liable was premature because of husband’s contested claim that he qualifies as innocent spouse, trial court erred because it alked accurate and complted documentation and other evidence necessary to calculated such amounts.

Final judgment and decree of divorce, incorporating jury verdict for wife against husband and several third-party plaintiffs, jointly and severally AFFIRMED; because husband and third-party plaintiffs induced and expressly acquiesced in verdict being against them all jointly and severally at jury charge conference, Court refused to entertain their allegation of such error on appeal.

Huling v. Huling, S10F1591 (03/07/11).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 18, 2011.

Trial Court’s order terminating father’s child support obligation with regard to his 18-year-old son for whom he had agreed to support until child ‘ “reaches the age of eighteen…; provided that if [the child] becomes eighteen years old while enrolled in and attending a secondary school on a full time basis, then the child support shall continue for [said child] until he has graduated from secondary school or reaches the age of twenty, whichever comes first,” ” reversed; once child enrolls in approved online courses in effort to graduate from secondary school, his online attendance constitutes attending school for the purposes of extending child support beyond child’s 18th birthday; further full-time  school does not require atendance during summer month, and thus trial court erred in determining that father’s child-support obligation terminated because child was not enrolled in and attednign school on full-time basis during summer after he turned 18; trial court was not required to base its determination concerning continuation of child support beyond child’s reaching 18 solely on whether child was enrolled in and atetending high school on his 18th birthday but on whether child reach majority while still engaged in pursuing secondary education.

Draughn v. Draugh, S10A1599, S10A1600 (03/07/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 18, 2011.

Final judgment and decree of divorce AFFIRMED; trial court did not err in considering husband’s K-1 income in its calculation of gross income for child support purposed, and it did not abuse its discretion in using average K-1 income over past three years rather than average calculated over longer period because statutory guidelines provide only that income from closely help corporation should be casefully reviewed when dtermining appropriate level of gross income to use in calculating child support; trial court properly considered husband’s fringe benefits, such as his company’s payment of his truck payment and expenses, cell phone and some meals and inlcuded them in his gross income because such benefits significantly reduced his personal living expenses; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireing that husband maintain life insurance, with sole beneficiary being trust for his child and wife anmed as trustee, in amount that exceeded his cumlative child support obligation because O.C. G. A. 19-6-34 (a) does not limit value of such insurance to future support obligation of parent; trial court did not exceed scope of O.C.G. A. 19-6-34 in ordering creation of trust or in declining to consider cost of life insurance premium in calculating husband’s child support obliation because evidence showed that husband’s company paid premiums; trial court did not err in requireing husband to pay entire cost of child’s medical insurance as well as uncovered medical expenses becuase trial court made adjustment to his presumptive amount of child support to account for such expenses; trial court did not err in awarding husnband possession of his company-owned truck and obligating him for any associated debts and ongoing expenses because trial court did not purport to chang any aspect of arrangement between husband and his company; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife 15K in attorneys’ fees because record indicated that in making award trial court considered relative financial positions of parties.

Simmons v. Simmons, S10F1818 (02/28/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying parties’ 2005 divorce decree by reducing father’s child support obligtion to $981.25 per month plus annual payment of 25 percent of any gross commissions or other income received above his $3,500 monthly base salary, vacated, 6-1, as trial court erred in including additional annual child support provision without making and applying necessary findings of fact set forth in O.C.G.A. 19-6-15(i)(1)(B); trial court’s construction was contrary to intent of child support guidelines to have each parent contribute to his or her pro rata share of child support and requirement that presumptive child support amount consist of sum certain, which may only be varied, if trial court specifically finds deviations supported by written findings of fact; statute’s plain language mandates that trial court follow child support guidelines by utilizing child support worksheet to arrive at presumptive amount, and that any amount above or below presumptive amount should be considered deviation; case remanded with direction for trial court to enter new order consistent with applicable statutory provisions.

Stowell v. Huguenard, S10A1700 (02/28/2011).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  March 11, 2011.

Trial court’s attempt to change order on legitimation petition from dismissal with prejudice to dismissal without prejudice, REVERSED; changing order in subsequent term of court from dismissal with prejudice to dismissal without prejudice was not clerical error but substantive change not authorized under Georgia law.

Ivery v. Brown, A10A2298 (02/07/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, February 25, 2011.