The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Bessie Hudgins’ petition for grandparents’ visitation rights as to her youngest grandchild, and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in finding that Echols v. Smith, 207 Ga. App. 317 (1993), and Campbell v. Holcomb, 193 Ga. App. 474 (1989), controlled this case, since the Georgia Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (b) several months after Echols to provide that a grandparent may intervene and petition for visitation following a minor grandchild’s adoption by either a blood relative or a step-parent, as occurred in this case. The Court also held that the stepfather’s adoption of the minor child, which made him the legal parent under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19 (a) (2), did not automatically preclude Hudgins’ from seeking visitation rights, even though § 19-7-3 (b) provides that a grandparent’s original action for visitation is not authorized where the minor child’s parents are not separated and the child is living with both parents. The Court cited the recent case of Kunz v. Bailey, S11G0867 (01/09/12), 12 FCDR 79 (01/13/12), and held that the trial court erred in dismissing Hudgins’ petition, without making additional findings concerning whether the minor child’s mother and the adoptive step-father were separated and whether the child was living with both of them.

Hudgins v. Harding, A11A2247 (01/18/12)

Fulton County Daily Report, January 27, 2012

The Supreme Court partially reversed the final judgment in the parties’ divorce case, holding that the trial court improperly denied the father’s motion for new trial based on the incorporation of a parenting plan providing that the child’s therapist had the authority to determine the termination of supervision of the father’s overnight visitation with the child. Because the provision was a material change in visitation that allowed for an automatic change of the father’s visitation without judicial scrutiny into the child’s best interests, it constituted an invalid self-executing change of visitation that the trial court should not have included in the judgment and divorce decree.

Johnson v. Johnson, S11F1856 (1/09/12)
Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, (2011), in which the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Carrie Jean and Douglas Bailey’s motion to dismiss Robert and Royce Kunz’s petition for grandparent visitation of the Baileys’ child, who was conceived with the Kunzes’ son but later adopted by Douglas Bailey. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (b), grandparents can seek court-sanctioned visitation rights to their grandchild in an original action, as opposed to intervention in a custody action, only where the parents are separated or the child is not living with both parents, and the statute does not distinguish between classes of parents such as natural, adoptive or a combination thereof. Accordingly, the Court held that as a matter of law Douglas Bailey became the child’s parent when he adopted her in 2006 and the child became a stranger to her biological father and his relatives, including the Kunzes; Douglas Bailey was the child’s parent when the Kunzes filed their original visitation action; and the Kunzes had no basis for filing that action because the child was living with both her parents, the Baileys, at that time.

Order terminating children’s father’s parental rights, affirmed, as children were deprived, father was unable to provide proper care for children, deprivation was likely to continue and termination was in children’s best interest; after being granted unsupervised visitation with children, father beat one child with belt on child’s buttocks, legs and thighs resulting in child’s hospitalization, father was arrested for child cruelty, and when asked about incident by juvenile court, he exercised Fifth Amendment rights; father had cognitive problems that affected his ability to parent and to implement skills learned in parenting classes and counseling, he had history of anger management problems, engaged in angry outburst in telephone call with evaluating psychologist, admitted to physically disciplining one child in connection with toilet training and displayed anger in regards to one child’s toilet training.

In the Interest of T. P., A11A0304 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Order modifying terms of appellant’s visitation rights, affirmed, as custody evaluation was proper in this case though the case originally involved visitation; parties were divorced and consented to joint legal and physical custody of children; appellee filed petition seeking to modify terms of appellant’s visitation; custody evaluator was assigned to case, and her findings were not to be distributed except with court’s permission; appellant called expert witness who admitted to having copy of custody evaluator’s report; trial court granted appellee’s petition to modify appellant’s visitation; trial court did not err in declining to declare a mistrial after guardian ad litem advised court in chambers about statements made by one child, while appellant was not there, since his attorney was present and made no objection at the time, attorney waited until guardian placed evidence on record in matter before objecting, guardian did not introduce unreported evidence in chambers, and appellant failed to support argument that guardian’s statements so prejudiced court that it could not have ruled properly; prohibiting appellant’s expert from testifying about the report did not violate appellant’s due process rights; expert’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not violated; appellant had no standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of expert, and expert consented to the court’s request to view file which contained unauthorized report; appellant properly held in contempt of court for allowing his expert to review the custody evaluator’s report; no error in denying appellant’s motion in limine to exclude from record portions of evaluator’s report that contained the children’s statements; to degree any statements could be considered hearsay, the courts have presumed to have disregarded it.

Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0262 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s  therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).

Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).

Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Order lifting certain restrictions on visitation rights of mother AFFIRMED, as OCGA 19-9-3(b) authorized trial court to modify visitation rights during contempt proceeding; trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying terms of final judgment to allow mother to resume unsupervised visitation because no evidence showed that mother was present danger to children as she testified that since her visitation rights have been restricted based on her failure to demonstrate that someone had directly witnessed her give urine sample for certain test, she had been seeing physician specializing in addiction medicine and had provided him with urine samples for testing, and no evidence showed that she actually tested positive for drugs or alcohol during prior test or at any subsequent test.

Gildar v. Gildar, A11A0759 (06/01/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, (06/17/2011)

Denial of father’s motion for summary judgment, AFFIRMED, in action brought by child’s maternal grandparents seeking visitation with child; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in denying summary judgment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-56(f), to allow guardian ad litem to investigate facts as some evidence showed that lack of relationship between grandparents and child might not be fault of grandparents.

Lightfoot v. Hollins, A10A1923 (01/26/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 2/11/2011

Criminal contempt order requiring Rhode Island resident to pay $5K fine and be imprisoned for 200 days for her failure to comply with terms of temporary modification of parental grandparents’ visitation rights to her two children REVERSED; trial court had jurisdiction over grandparents’ modification action, since initial custody determination complied with OCGA 19-9-61, children’s father still lived in Georgia, and personal jurisdiction over mother was not necessary in order to address requested modification; trial court lacked personal jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) over mother for contempt and personal service of mother outside Georgia was invalid under circumstances;  Court relied on Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (1986), which held that Georgia courts did not have personal jurisdiciton over non-risident mother, who was served outside Georgia, under either now-repealed UCCJEA or long arm statutue, and found the UCCJEA required same result; UCCJEA specifically addresses continuing jurisdiction of cusotdy issues, but not contempt issues and it did not repeal any existing statutory provisions covering divorce, custody, alimony or child support procedures; mother did not admit personal jurisdiciton when she failed to respond to discovery served with complaint, since return of service only showed that she was served with summons and complaint, not discovery; contempt order was not enforceable in Rhode Island pursuant to UCCJEA, since applicable provisions referred to custody determinations and did not includ contempt orders.

Daniels v. Barnes,  A07A1719 (03/04/08), 08 FCDR 795

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008

Order awarding mother child support and providing father with certain visitation rights, AFFIRMED; absent transcript, trial court’s judgment was presumably correct; appellant failed to support his first claim with citation to authority or argument.

Sebby v. Costo, A07A2138 (03/05/08), 08 FCDR 795

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008