Attorney Lien by Contract. Can an Attorney By Contract, Create a Lienable Interest in a Property that is Not Dtherwise Lienable Under O.C.G.A. § ‘ 5-‘9-‘4? Where an attorney represented a client in a post-divorce custody modification action, and did not help that client to secure an interest in a particular parcel of real property, she did nat have proper a lien against her client’s former house under O.C.G.A. § ‘5-‘9-‘ 4 as a result of her custody case work simply because of the following language included in her retainer agreement: “You agree that, for the purposes of this Representation Agreement, any real or personal property you have will be deemed to have been recovered as contemplated by O .C.G.A. § ‘ 5-‘9-‘4 in proceedings undertaken by the Firm on your behalf.” Because this statute is in derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed. Since no portion of a .c.G.A. § ‘5-‘9-‘ 5 contemplates creation of a lienable interest in real or personal property through simple contract alone on the contrary, the lien may only “attach to the fruits of the labor and skill of the attorney’ – then this lien was invalid and foreclosure of the lien was properly denied by the trial court. The appellate court seemingly left it an open question as to whether or not the attorney could have properly placed a lien under O.C.G.A. § ‘ 5-‘9-‘4 on the $50,000.00 that the ex-husband received as part of the settlement of the custody case, and it also hinted that, at times, it might be proper for a trial court to impose an “equitable lien”against certain property.
Attorney Lien by Contract: Outlaw v. Rye, 312 Ga . App, 5i9 (2011)
Trial court’s attempt to change order on legitimation petition from dismissal with prejudice to dismissal without prejudice, REVERSED; changing order in subsequent term of court from dismissal with prejudice to dismissal without prejudice was not clerical error but substantive change not authorized under Georgia law.
Ivery v. Brown, A10A2298 (02/07/2011)
From: Fulton County Daily Report, February 25, 2011.
Ruling on contempt sanction partially reversed; trial court impermissiby modified divorce decree when it ordered ex-husband to pay his ex-wife $1875 in lieu of transferring one-half of his 401(K) account to her; contempt order did not merely clarify 401(K) provision in divorce decree, but transmuted award into presently-due-cash obligation; ample evidence supported trial court’s finding that ex-wife did not willfully disobey divorce decree provision requiring her to leave marital residence – run-down mobile home – in same condition; trial court did not fail to consider parties’ financial circumstances in awarding ex-wife $1,200 in attorney’s fees for contempt proceeding but trial court should reconsider fees on remand and consider revising it in its discretion to extent it was based on 401(k) issue; ex-husband waived right to closing argument at contempt hearing when he failed to request it.
Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, S09A1137 (11/23/09)
Attorney disbarred for violating Rules of Professional Conduct; attorney failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing personal injury client, made false statement to Officer of General Counsel (OGC) after client filed grievance and did not take steps to protect client’s interests after terminating representation; in another case, attorney altered his divorce client’s discovery responses without consulting client, signed client’s name to misleading and inaccurate financial affidavit without authorization, did not refund client’s unearned fees and made false statements to OGC.
Trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape of child’s (victim’s) forensic interview, when interviewer develops rapport with child, does not attempt to influence child, asks open-ended questions and followed most widely-used forensic technique in country.
Brown v. State, A09A0894 (10/07/09)
Attorneys: Anne L. Watson, Travis Anton Williams, Lee Darragh, Wanda Lynn Vance
Judges: David Burroughs, Hall Superior Court; Phipps, Bernes, Adams, Georgia Court of Appeals
A GA mother who suffers from a mood and personality disorders but is adverse to medication, does not comply with the goals of a reunification plan, fails to stabilize her volatility, and fails to maintain steady employment and stable housing, is evidence of a lack of parental care or control causing a child’s deprivation, the deprivation is likely to continue, and the deprivation is likely to cause the child serious harm.
Termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child when she has been in DFACS custody for all but eight of her 27 months.
Judicial notice of evidence, exhibits, testimony and unappealed court orders in an underlying deprivation proceedings in the same court is not an abuse of discretion when the parent was allowed to confront the witnesses.
Trail counsel is not deficient for stipulating to evidence admitted in prior deprivation proceedings.