Trial court’s determination in this action in equity that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing her equitable claim, affirmed; petitioner stated that alleged settlement agreement was supposed to have been incorporated in her divorce decree, but she failed to take any action to remedy that omission for 12 years, she took no action for five years after alleged pension payments became due but were not paid, she failed to act when payments she alleged were made under agreement were reduced in amount and paid only sporadically and she waited additional two years after alleged pension payments stopped altogether to bring this action seeking equitable relief in form of constructive trust.

Davis v. Davis, A10A2195 (07/06/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Judgement modifying parties’ 2005 divorce decree by reducing father’s child support obligtion to $981.25 per month plus annual payment of 25 percent of any gross commissions or other income received above his $3,500 monthly base salary, vacated, 6-1, as trial court erred in including additional annual child support provision without making and applying necessary findings of fact set forth in O.C.G.A. 19-6-15(i)(1)(B); trial court’s construction was contrary to intent of child support guidelines to have each parent contribute to his or her pro rata share of child support and requirement that presumptive child support amount consist of sum certain, which may only be varied, if trial court specifically finds deviations supported by written findings of fact; statute’s plain language mandates that trial court follow child support guidelines by utilizing child support worksheet to arrive at presumptive amount, and that any amount above or below presumptive amount should be considered deviation; case remanded with direction for trial court to enter new order consistent with applicable statutory provisions.

Stowell v. Huguenard, S10A1700 (02/28/2011).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011

Judgement ordering appellant to pay to his ex-wife out-of-pocket sum of $64,044.45, in addition to $33,955.55 sum from his share of net profits from sale of parties’ lake house, PARTIALL REVERSED ; plain language of Paragraph 7 (b) of parties’ post-nuptial agreement stated that appellant was required to reimburse appellee for her separate $98K investment in property solely ‘ “from his 50% share of the net profits,” ‘ not from any separate assets, which he may have, and appellant’s 50% share of net profits was $33,955.55; trial court did not err in ordering that sale proceeds from lake house be used to pay $220,564 line of credit, which parties incurred, since Paragraph 7 (b) defines net profit in relevant part as net of debt on Lake House, with no language limiting term debt to money borrowed to improve house itself; appellee conveyed title to house to bank to secure line of credit, and it is clear that line of credit constituted debt on Lake House with-in post-nuptial agreement’s plain language; appellant’s contention that it would violate Paragraph 16 16(a)(4) of post nuptial agreement – providing generally that debt incurred with express permission of other party – to deduct final line of credit from lake house proceeds, since specific provision will prevail over general one, Paragraph 7 (b) provides that parties’ debt on lake house, which clearly indicates lines of credit secured by house, must be paid off when house is sold, and record showed that appellant was explicity aware of first two lines of credit on lake house, which were used to purchased parties’ martial residence and to fund parties’ juoint business, reguardless of whiter they were made in appellee’s name alone.

Holland v. Holland, S10A1158 (10/04/2010), 10 FCDR 3176

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, October 15, 2010.

Order nuling that Section 3 of settlement agreement relating to divorce decree at issue was unambiguous and that deceased ex-wife intended to grant her employee benefits to her ex-husband, REVERSED; Section 3 of parties’ agreement completely, clearly and unambiguously expressed parties’ intent that beneficiary spouse released any and all interest in other party’s benefits at time of divorce and operated as complete waiver of appellee’s beneficiary designation; even if Section 3 required construction for purose of determining parties’ intent, its third sentence stated that spouse may voluntarily provide benefits to other spouse at any subsequent date, which reinforced parties’ intent that preceeding language was to operate as immediate release of any claim to other’s benefits; there was no affirmative act by ex-wife to constitute attempt to counter or override relinquishment of rights or claims under parties’ agreement; case remanded to trial court for consideration consistent with this opinion and Court noted that any question of appellee’s failure to abide by agreement and any finding of willfulness or contempt was for trial court to decide; ex-wife committed suicide and died intestate five days after divorce.

DeRyke v. Teets, S10A0710 (11/08/2010), 10 FCDR 3587.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/19/2010.

Judgement REVERSED in parties’ divorce case; undisputed evidence showed at least $18 difference in amount of child support set forth in parties’ separation agreement and amount mandated by child support guidelines, trial court’s order failed to set forth mandatory findings under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 for deviation from guidelines and wife’s voluntarily agreement to deviation could not change this result; award of attorneys’ fees to husband following denial of wife’s motion for new trial/motion to set aside divorce decree, REVERSED, as fee award could not stand absent required finds of fact and evidence of husbnad’s counsel’s work.

Order granting wife’s motion for contempt against ex-husband for violating terms of Settlement Agreement by exposing parties’ daughter to Christianity, AFFIRMED, as Agreement provided that wife had sole final decision-making authority with represent to religious matters and, even in absence of agreement, wife, as custodial parent would have final decision with respect to religion; husband’s act of exposing daughter to Christianity and making highly offensive comments to daughter about wife did not warrant finding of willful contempt, because husband apologized and showed remorse.

Greene v. Green, A10A1463; A10A1464 (10/01/2010), 10 FCDR 3286.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, October 22, 2010.

Greene v. Greene, A10A1463; A10A1464 (10/01/10), 10 FCDR 3286.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 10/22/2010.

Judgement AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; absent transcript, evidence presumably supported trial court’s findings that husband was estopped from challenging final order after he availed himself of benefits; Court reiterated “long-standing principle that one who has accepted benefits such as spousal support or equitable division of property under a divorce decree is stopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits,” and, in so doing, disapproved of Grissom v. Grissom, 282 Ga. 267 (2007), which “attempted to create exceptions to estoppel doctrine,” without providing guidance as to how and when such exceptions apply; former spouse can continue to receive temporary alimony without waiving right to appeal; ruling in this case does not invalidate line of cases, which hold that former spouse may collect child support award and still repudiate final judment, since those benefits belong to child.

Judgment incorporating parties’ mediated settlement agreement, partially reversed; trial court erred in ruling that mediated agreement was not court-referenced or court-annexed mediation, since trial court referred parties’ divorce case to mediation, competent mediator conducted mediation under applicable rules, trial court is charged with overseeing ntegrity of mediation once it is initiated and parties did not petition trial court to remove case from mediation; issue of attorney and witness fees to wife, remanded for trial court to make specific finds to support such award; husband di dnot comply with Model Court Mediation Rule 12 (d)(2), since he did not file his objection to parties’ settlement agreement with mediation program coordinator with three calendar days and husband’s filing of his objection with wife’s attotney did not consitute substantial complaince with Rule 12; husband’s contention that mediator exceeded his proper role by drafting settlement agreement was meritless; trial court did not err in calling mediator to testify at hearing on wife’s motion to enforce settlement agreement, since mediator was only witness available to tetify about husband’s mental and emotional condition during mediation and mediator did not testify about any substantive settlement discussions or any specific confidential communciations; trial court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing agreement, given husband’s $2M net worth.

Wilson v. Wilson, S07F1201 (11/21/07), 07 FCDR 3585

Fulton County Daily Report, 12/07/2007

Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.