The Supreme Court partially reversed the order retroactively extinguishing William Branham’s alimony obligation to his former wife Jenny Nicholson f/k/a Branham, holding that the trial court’s order vitiated the finality of the judgment obtained as to each past due installment and was therefore clearly contrary to the rule set forth in Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874 (1992). However, the Court affirmed that portion of the order providing that each party would be responsible for his or her own attorneys’ fees, holding that Nicholson waived her right to challenge the order under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (b), where she acquiesced in the trial court’s ruling, never requested attorneys’ fees and failed to provide any evidence supporting a claim for attorneys’ fees.

Branham v. Branham, S11A1896 (01/09/12)

Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

The Supreme Court partially reversed the final judgment in the parties’ divorce case, holding that the trial court improperly denied the father’s motion for new trial based on the incorporation of a parenting plan providing that the child’s therapist had the authority to determine the termination of supervision of the father’s overnight visitation with the child. Because the provision was a material change in visitation that allowed for an automatic change of the father’s visitation without judicial scrutiny into the child’s best interests, it constituted an invalid self-executing change of visitation that the trial court should not have included in the judgment and divorce decree.

Johnson v. Johnson, S11F1856 (1/09/12)
Fulton County Daily Report, January 13, 2012

Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (j), reversed, as floor amount of child support provided in parties’ settlement agreement did not construe clear and express waiver of right of modification; parties’ decision not to include in their agreement well-worn waiver language set forth in Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (1978), or its equivalent, suggested that they did not intend to forbid statutory downward modification of husband’s child support obligation, even below floor amount.

Dean v. Dean, S11A0739 (09/12/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 23, 2011

Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s  therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).

Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).

Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Order lifting certain restrictions on visitation rights of mother AFFIRMED, as OCGA 19-9-3(b) authorized trial court to modify visitation rights during contempt proceeding; trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying terms of final judgment to allow mother to resume unsupervised visitation because no evidence showed that mother was present danger to children as she testified that since her visitation rights have been restricted based on her failure to demonstrate that someone had directly witnessed her give urine sample for certain test, she had been seeing physician specializing in addiction medicine and had provided him with urine samples for testing, and no evidence showed that she actually tested positive for drugs or alcohol during prior test or at any subsequent test.

Gildar v. Gildar, A11A0759 (06/01/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, (06/17/2011)

Trial court’s orders entered in post-divorce litigation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disapproved of therapist to whom mother took child; trial court DID NOT ERROR when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismssed contempt, visitation, and custotdy portions of mother’s petition and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismssed claims, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-9-24 (b); because Mother filed current petition for modification of child support 11 moths after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modification of child support, trial court DID NOT ERROR in dismissing portion of mother’s petition seeking modification of child support, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (K)(2); trial court DID NOT ERROR as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview chid’s thereapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s thereapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owned guardian ad litem because mother was not prevailing party, and no statue required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning share of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order; trial court DID NOT ABUSE its discreton in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiciton to deny mother’s motiuon to set asside ward of attorney’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees did not supplement, amend, lter, or modify that judgment; mother’s application for discretionary review of denial of her motion to set aside award of attorney’s fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) are involved, application for appeal is requiered when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-35(a).

Avren v. GArten, S11A0064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTICIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award or findings authorizing award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Trial court’s award of primary custody of children to father, AFFIRMED, since fact that trial court read case file – which included testimony previously submitted by affidavit, but not admitted into evidence – did not provide that trial court consdered affidavit as evidence for purposes of final hearing or used information in affidavit in reaching decision.

Carroll v. Carroll, A10A2332 (11/29/10), 10 FCDR 3938.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 12/17 /2010.

Downward modification of child support award as well as modification of visitation and parenting time, AFFIRMED, after father petitioned for modifications of both child custody and child support awards based on his becoming unemployed; trial court DID NOT ERR in failing to make its downward modification of child support in child support, and thus O.C.G.A. § 10-6-15 (j), did not apply to keep child support from accruing; trial court DID NOT ERR in inputing income to father, despite his involuntary unemployment, because evidence showed that he was unemployed for proplonged period of time and did not make significant effort to gain employment; no factual basis supported father’s argument that trial court relied on incorrect estimate of mother’s income, since mother’s financial affidavit included both salary and tips; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to modify downward father’s obligation reguarding child’s medical and dental exprenses because trial court was not required to allocate parties’ share of child’s healthcare expenses at same rate as their share of child support award, and parties did not present evidence on subject to trial court; trial court did not err in failing to address father’s visitation suggestions because it determined that there was no evidence of material change in circumstances warranting medification of current custodial agreement.

Galvin v. Galvin, S10A1104 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3467

From:  Fulton Count Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Denial of plaintiff’s petition for modification in custody and child support, alleging that defendant, who had primary custody of parties’ son, was negligent in his care and deficient in meeting his medical needs, AFFIRMED; trial court DID NOT ERR in declining to strike defendant’s testimony in its entirety on ground that he was guilty of false swearing, because record was completely devoid of any evidence that he acted with manifest purpose to testify falsely.