The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Bessie Hudgins’ petition for grandparents’ visitation rights as to her youngest grandchild, and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in finding that Echols v. Smith, 207 Ga. App. 317 (1993), and Campbell v. Holcomb, 193 Ga. App. 474 (1989), controlled this case, since the Georgia Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (b) several months after Echols to provide that a grandparent may intervene and petition for visitation following a minor grandchild’s adoption by either a blood relative or a step-parent, as occurred in this case. The Court also held that the stepfather’s adoption of the minor child, which made him the legal parent under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19 (a) (2), did not automatically preclude Hudgins’ from seeking visitation rights, even though § 19-7-3 (b) provides that a grandparent’s original action for visitation is not authorized where the minor child’s parents are not separated and the child is living with both parents. The Court cited the recent case of Kunz v. Bailey, S11G0867 (01/09/12), 12 FCDR 79 (01/13/12), and held that the trial court erred in dismissing Hudgins’ petition, without making additional findings concerning whether the minor child’s mother and the adoptive step-father were separated and whether the child was living with both of them.

Hudgins v. Harding, A11A2247 (01/18/12)

Fulton County Daily Report, January 27, 2012

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, (2011), in which the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Carrie Jean and Douglas Bailey’s motion to dismiss Robert and Royce Kunz’s petition for grandparent visitation of the Baileys’ child, who was conceived with the Kunzes’ son but later adopted by Douglas Bailey. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (b), grandparents can seek court-sanctioned visitation rights to their grandchild in an original action, as opposed to intervention in a custody action, only where the parents are separated or the child is not living with both parents, and the statute does not distinguish between classes of parents such as natural, adoptive or a combination thereof. Accordingly, the Court held that as a matter of law Douglas Bailey became the child’s parent when he adopted her in 2006 and the child became a stranger to her biological father and his relatives, including the Kunzes; Douglas Bailey was the child’s parent when the Kunzes filed their original visitation action; and the Kunzes had no basis for filing that action because the child was living with both her parents, the Baileys, at that time.

Award to their maternal grandparents of permanent custody of two special needs children who had previously been adjudicated deprived, affirmed, with limited visitation to parents, as clear and convincing evidence showed that parental custody would harm children and that grandparents’ custody would best promote children’s health, welfare and happiness; while parents consistently failed to attend to children’s special needs and physical well-being, grandparents had served as children’s primary caregivers for several years, were fully cognizant of their special needs, were actively involved in securing services and therapies for children and charting their progress, and were in position due to their retirement to carefully monitor children on daily basis; for same reasons, juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying parents’ motion for reunification, which sought to modify or vacate unexpired deprivation order based on alleged change in circumstances.

In the Interest of D. W. and L. W., A11A1463; A11A1464; A11A1465 (09/15/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 30, 2011

Denial of mother’s and maternal grandmother’s motion to dismiss paternal grandparents’ petition for visitation rights or in alternative to transfer case for improper venue, reversed, as mother was not properly served with process , even though she was subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Georgia’s long-arm statute; clear and convincing evidence rebutted paternal grandparents’ prima facie case of proper service under long-arm statute based on sheriff’s return of service, since sheriff served mother at maternal grandmother’s prior Georgia address, even though mother was residing in Arizona at that time, and paternal grandparents submitted no evidence showing that service was proper other than sheriff’s return of service; venue was not proper in Effingham county, since maternal grandmother moved to Chatham county before paternal grandparents filed their petition; although maternal grandmother continued to utilize her former Effingham county residence address to retain certain benefits including filing temporary guardianship petition there and keeping her children in Effingham county schools, evidence showed that she was domiciled in Chatham county, so case remanded with direction for trial court to transfer it to Chatham County Superior Court.

Oglesby v. Deal, A11A1239 (09/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 23, 2011

Dismissal of petition seeking custody of plaintiff’s two minor granddaughters, reversed, as trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to state claim; petition gave fair notice that plaintiffs sought custody of children under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1 (b.1) and 19-9-2 based on mother’s alleged murder of father, and these allegations were sufficient to survive motion to dismiss; collateral estoppel did not bar custody action because plaintiff’s prior unsuccessful petition for visitation involved different legal issues; res judicata did not bar custody action because O.C.G.A. § 19-9-45 only applies to issues actually decided in prior action and visitation order related to plaintiffs’ right to visitation, not custody.

Scott v, Scott, A11A1206 (09/20/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, October 7, 2011

Denial of parents’ motion to dismiss grandparents’ petition for grandparent visitation of child who was conceived with grandparents’ son but later adopted by father, REVERSED; because adoption statute’s definition of parent includes legal father of child, trial court ERRED in declining to dismiss grandparents’ motion because limiting language of O.C.G.A. 19-7-3(b) – forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if parents are together and living with child – therefore also includes adoptive parents.

Bailey v. Kunz, A10A1809 (02/03/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/18/2011

Denial of father’s motion for summary judgment, AFFIRMED, in action brought by child’s maternal grandparents seeking visitation with child; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in denying summary judgment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-56(f), to allow guardian ad litem to investigate facts as some evidence showed that lack of relationship between grandparents and child might not be fault of grandparents.

Lightfoot v. Hollins, A10A1923 (01/26/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 2/11/2011

Criminal contempt order requiring Rhode Island resident to pay $5K fine and be imprisoned for 200 days for her failure to comply with terms of temporary modification of parental grandparents’ visitation rights to her two children REVERSED; trial court had jurisdiction over grandparents’ modification action, since initial custody determination complied with OCGA 19-9-61, children’s father still lived in Georgia, and personal jurisdiction over mother was not necessary in order to address requested modification; trial court lacked personal jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) over mother for contempt and personal service of mother outside Georgia was invalid under circumstances;  Court relied on Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507 (1986), which held that Georgia courts did not have personal jurisdiciton over non-risident mother, who was served outside Georgia, under either now-repealed UCCJEA or long arm statutue, and found the UCCJEA required same result; UCCJEA specifically addresses continuing jurisdiction of cusotdy issues, but not contempt issues and it did not repeal any existing statutory provisions covering divorce, custody, alimony or child support procedures; mother did not admit personal jurisdiciton when she failed to respond to discovery served with complaint, since return of service only showed that she was served with summons and complaint, not discovery; contempt order was not enforceable in Rhode Island pursuant to UCCJEA, since applicable provisions referred to custody determinations and did not includ contempt orders.

Daniels v. Barnes,  A07A1719 (03/04/08), 08 FCDR 795

Fulton County Daily Report, 03/21/2008

Order granting maternal grandmother visitation rights with her daughter’s two children, pursuant to Georgia’s Grandparent Visitation Statute, AFFIRMED; daughter could not challenge visitation order, since she aided in causing order by moving trial court to enforce earlier visitation agreement and there was no evidence of fraud or mistake; daughter was authorized to file instant appeal, pursuant to OCGA 5-6-34(a)(11); Court declined to dismiss daughter’s appeal and denied grandmother’s motion to sanction daughter for filing frivolous appeal.

Hargett v. Dickey, A10A0762 (05/20/2010), 10 FCDR 1702

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/04/2010).

Denial of former foster parents’ petition to adopt minor, AFFIRMED; trial court did not err in holding that foster parents lacked standing to pursue adoption, because OCGA 19-8-5(a) provides for adoption, if living parents have voluntarily surrendered their rights in writing to third person pursuing adoption and, in this case, parents surrendered their rights to minor’s maternal grandmother; trial court did not err in disregarding OCGA 49-5-281, Foster Parent’s Bill of Rights, because trial court did consider foster parents throughout doption process and Department of Human Services has absolute discretion in adoption decisions; evidence supported trial court’s decision that it would be inminor’s best interest to remain at material grandmother’s house; previous appellate deicsion, holding that there was no evidence supporting finding that adoption by maternal grandmother was in minor’s best interest, did not demand finding that adoption by foster parent was in child’s best interest; foster parents’ argument based on OCGA 19-8-18(d) rejcted, because that section is based on peitions brought pursuant to OCGA 19-8-5, which was inapplicable.

Owen v. Watts, A10A0774 (04/13/2010), 10 FCDR 1448

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (4/13/2010)