Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.

Judgment, AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce action; record belied husband’s contention that terms of parties’ oral settlement agreement were still in dispute, since husband testified that he knew agreement would be set forth on record and did not object to any terms when wife’s attorney stated them on record and, thus, trial court did not err in finding that agreement existed between parties or in making agreement part of final decree; trial court did not abuse its discretion in DENYING husband’s request for attorney’s fees.

Sponsler v. Sponsler, S10F0299 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 07/09/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce case; trial court DID NOT ERR in awarding wife $200K in lump sum equitable property division, since evidence authorized jury to find that value of marital property exceeded that amount; $600K lump sum alimony award was not excessive, given evidence that husband owned more than $1.6M in property and that his gross monthly income exceeded $16.6K; husband failed to present evidence of his inability to pay property and alimony awards in timely fashion.

Wier v. Wier, S10F0553 (06/28/10), 10 FCDR 2062

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 7/9/2010

Judgment in parties’ divorce case, PARTIALLY REVERSED, and case REMANDED; final degree internally contradicted each party’s share of their minor child’s uninsured health case expenses, since test of decree required 61-39 percent split and incorporated child support addendum required 50-50 split; trial court erred in ordering husband to maintain minor child’s health insurance, without including that expense in calculating his child support obligation, since husband testified that his monthly heath premium would be $238, OCGA 19-6-15 (b)(6) requires proration of child care and health insurance expenses between parents in arriving at adjusted child support obligation and, under section (b)(7), trial court must modify adjusted child support obligation by factoring amount of health and child care expenses each parent actually pays; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireingwife to pay half of loan balance as of date of divorce decree, rather than date of trial, even though trial court did not enter decree until 155 days after trial, since trial court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, and OCGA 15-6-21(a), which requires rulings on motion within 30 days after hearing in counties with less than 100K inhabitants applies only to motions for new trials, injunctions, demurrers, and all other motion, not to bench trials in divorce actions; trial court had discretion to order sale of parties’ residence and to account for how existing mortgage would be paid until sale; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering husband to continue paying mortgage on marital residence, where he still resided, until he purchases home or it is sold; husband benefited from trial court’s omission of steps requiring pro ration of child care expenses under 19-6-15(b) because trial court order parents to split child care expenses equally and father’s pro rate share of expenses would have been 57&; trial court did not abuse its discretion in its visiation award.

Dupree v. Dupree, S10F0516 (06/07/2010), 10 FCDR 1824

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife $50K in lump sum alimony, since evidence supported trial court’s findings regarding husband’s income level; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in determining that home in Tattnall county was wife’s separate property, since husband quitclaimed any interest he had in property to wife prior to their second marriage; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife her retirement account, given trial court’s diligent separation of parties’ assets and overall asset distribution; trial court DID NOT err in calculating child support; evidence of husband’s adulterous acts during parties’ second marriage revived his prior acts during their first marriage as admissible evidence; trial court DID NOT abuse its discretion in awarding wife attorneys’ fees; husband had reasonable notice that trial court would consider wife’s contempt claims based on unpaid child support at divorce trial.

Wood v. Wood, S07F1474 (01/08/08), 08 FCDR 66

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (01/25/08)

Judgment on parties’ divorce case, REVERSED, as trial court erred in finding that 10-yer requirement set forth in Uniformed Services Former Souses’ Protection Act, 10 USC § 1408 (d) (2), prevented it from making equitable division of husband’s military retirement benefits; 10-year requirement is simply limitation on direct payment mechanism of that Act and has no bearing on state court’s authority to treat military retirement benefits as divisible marital property; trial court DID NOT manifestly abuse its discretion in denying wife’s motion to supplement appellate record.

Michel v. Michel, S10F0372 (03/29/10), 10 FCDR 1012

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (04/09/2010)

Judgment REVERSED in parties’ divorce case; trial court erred in relying on Virginia cases interpreting Virginia statue to determine that stock options awarded to wife prior to marriage, but which vested during marriage, were akin to deferred compensation and, thus, constituted marital property – Georgia law does not have similar statutory scheme and does not support such bright-line rule; based on overarching principle in Payson v. Payson, 274 Ga. 321 (2001), trial court was required to look at evidence and determine whether vesting of previously awarded stock options directly resulted from “parties’ labors and investments during the marriage” and trial court must inquire as to whether any “appreciation of value of a non-marital asset results from the joint efforts of the parties during the marriage or is the result of market forces;” trial court also ERRED in ruling that portion of wife’s deferred compensation plan account was marital property, since wife created account prior to marriage and made no contributions to it during marriage; that account is wife’s separate property and husband is only entitled to any appreciation in value of account that directly resulted from parties’ labor during marriage;p trial court CORRECTLY found that husband is entitled to portion of $500 contribution, which wife made to premarital IRA account during marriage.

Newman v. Patton, S09F1718 (03/22/2010), 10 FCDR 863

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (4/2/2010)

Denial of summary judgment to decedent’s ex-wife, REVERSED, in A09A1876; denial of summary judgment to decedent’s son and executor to his estate, AFFIRMED, in A09A1877; trial court erred in denying summary judgment to ex-wife in her declaratory judgment action, even though settlement agreement between ex-wife and decedent after their divorce divested ex-wife of any interest in any account in decedent’s name, since agreement did not divest ex-wife of her interest as death beneficiary to certificate of deposit account – no language in agreement waived ex-wife’s expectancy interest as death beneficiary.

Frier v. Frier, A09A1876, A09A1877 (02/25/2010), 10 FCDR 576.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 03/12/2010.

Judgment in parties’ divorce case, AFFIRMED; trial court’s award of $40K in total alimony, actually constituted property division; with regard to parties’ marital debt, trial court stated that wife would continue to be responsible for $40K debt in her name, husband would pay wife $400 per month in alimony for 100 months for total of $40K and obligation would not terminate upon death or remarriage of either spouse; characterized of sum as alimony was not controlling, since alimony terminates at death or receiving spouse’s remarriage and trial court clearly intended award to equalize distribution of parties martial debt.

Moore v. Moore, S09F1667 (02/08/2010), 10 FCDR 324.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/19/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce case; trial court correctly applied source of funds rule in classifying sales proceeds from wife’s premarital house as her sole and separate property – unemployed husband presented no proof that he made alleged mortgage payments or performed any handyman work around house; husband’s claim regarding wife’s bank and credit union accounts failed, absent findings of fact, which neither party asked for; husband failed to show that trial court erred in awarding wife attorneys’ fees for his stubborn litigiousness; husband could not show that he was without fault in failing to appear at trial since he had ample notice.

Windham v. Araya, S09F1457 (02/08/2010), 10 FCDR 322