Final judgment and decree of divorce mandating that husband and wife be equally responsible for any tax liability from wife’s photography business and specifying exact dollar amounts for mimimum gross receipts and profiest to be reflected on wife’s business’s amended tax returns, PARTIALLY REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED; state courts generally are not authorized to impose income tax liability, and any determination in this case that parties were jointly and severally liable was premature because of husband’s contested claim that he qualifies as innocent spouse, trial court erred because it alked accurate and complted documentation and other evidence necessary to calculated such amounts.

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011

Judgement ordering appellant to pay to his ex-wife out-of-pocket sum of $64,044.45, in addition to $33,955.55 sum from his share of net profits from sale of parties’ lake house, PARTIALL REVERSED ; plain language of Paragraph 7 (b) of parties’ post-nuptial agreement stated that appellant was required to reimburse appellee for her separate $98K investment in property solely ‘ “from his 50% share of the net profits,” ‘ not from any separate assets, which he may have, and appellant’s 50% share of net profits was $33,955.55; trial court did not err in ordering that sale proceeds from lake house be used to pay $220,564 line of credit, which parties incurred, since Paragraph 7 (b) defines net profit in relevant part as net of debt on Lake House, with no language limiting term debt to money borrowed to improve house itself; appellee conveyed title to house to bank to secure line of credit, and it is clear that line of credit constituted debt on Lake House with-in post-nuptial agreement’s plain language; appellant’s contention that it would violate Paragraph 16 16(a)(4) of post nuptial agreement – providing generally that debt incurred with express permission of other party – to deduct final line of credit from lake house proceeds, since specific provision will prevail over general one, Paragraph 7 (b) provides that parties’ debt on lake house, which clearly indicates lines of credit secured by house, must be paid off when house is sold, and record showed that appellant was explicity aware of first two lines of credit on lake house, which were used to purchased parties’ martial residence and to fund parties’ juoint business, reguardless of whiter they were made in appellee’s name alone.

Holland v. Holland, S10A1158 (10/04/2010), 10 FCDR 3176

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, October 15, 2010.

Judgement, AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce case; trial court did not err in excluding evidence of temporary order, which allowed each party to draw $2.7k per month from his/her designated account, since decision in McEachern v. McEachern, 260 Ga. 320 (1990), controlled, no evidence showed that temporary order was necessary for impeachment purposes to prevent husband from perpetrating fraud on trial court and risk of admitting order outweighted its probative value.

Horton v. Horton, S10F0827 (11/08/10), 10 FCDR 3586

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/19/2010.

$41,500 jury award to wife from proceeds of real property to which appellant held title in case involving wife’s divorce from appellant’s son, REVERSED; trial court ERRED in ruling that property in question was marital asset and denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict, j.n.o.v. and new trial, and in instructing jury regarding equitable division of property, since evidence showed that appellant’s son transferred property to appellant before wife filed for divorce; wife cited no case law in which Court has recognized right to pursue equitable division of property titled in person other than one of spouses, without title to that property first being brought into estate of one of divorcing parties by determination that fraudulent conveyance has occurred; though divorcing spouse, who believes that property transferred away from other spouse is still subject to equitable division, can seek recourse, it is incumbent upon such spouse to pursue those avenues which wife here did not; all of appellant’s remainng enumerations of error were moot.

Armour v. Holcombe, S10F0946 (10/18/2010), 10 FCDR 3333.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/29/2010)

Judgement AFFIRMED in parties’ divorce action; absent transcript, evidence presumably supported trial court’s findings that husband was estopped from challenging final order after he availed himself of benefits; Court reiterated “long-standing principle that one who has accepted benefits such as spousal support or equitable division of property under a divorce decree is stopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits,” and, in so doing, disapproved of Grissom v. Grissom, 282 Ga. 267 (2007), which “attempted to create exceptions to estoppel doctrine,” without providing guidance as to how and when such exceptions apply; former spouse can continue to receive temporary alimony without waiving right to appeal; ruling in this case does not invalidate line of cases, which hold that former spouse may collect child support award and still repudiate final judment, since those benefits belong to child.

Judgment affirmed in parties’ divorce case; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to classify employer contributions to parties’ pension accounts as martial property and equitably dividing parties’ entire pension benefits; although pension accounts were marital property, evidence authorized finding that division of only parties’ contributions as employees to their pensions would best achieve equitable distribution; trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying wife’s request for attorneys’ fees.

Taylor v. Taylor, S07F1634 (01/28/08), 08 FCDR 207

Fulton County Daily Report, 02/08/2008.

Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.

Judgment, AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce action; record belied husband’s contention that terms of parties’ oral settlement agreement were still in dispute, since husband testified that he knew agreement would be set forth on record and did not object to any terms when wife’s attorney stated them on record and, thus, trial court did not err in finding that agreement existed between parties or in making agreement part of final decree; trial court did not abuse its discretion in DENYING husband’s request for attorney’s fees.

Sponsler v. Sponsler, S10F0299 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 07/09/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce case; trial court DID NOT ERR in awarding wife $200K in lump sum equitable property division, since evidence authorized jury to find that value of marital property exceeded that amount; $600K lump sum alimony award was not excessive, given evidence that husband owned more than $1.6M in property and that his gross monthly income exceeded $16.6K; husband failed to present evidence of his inability to pay property and alimony awards in timely fashion.

Wier v. Wier, S10F0553 (06/28/10), 10 FCDR 2062

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 7/9/2010