Juvenile court’s order, reversed, to extent it awarded custody of first child to father, vacated, to the extent it found reunification was not in second child’s best interests and placed her with her paternal grandmother, and, affirmed to extent it found second child derived; juvenile court did not err in finding second child deprived because evidence showed that mother physically abused child on at least two occasions, police were notified on one of those occasions, mother pled guilty to simple battery, and mother’s psychologist testified that she believed it was unwise to return children to mother’s custody unless and until mother sought further psychiatric counseling; however, juvenile court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review on issue of whether reunification was not in second child’s best interest because it did not specify which, if any, of presumptions under O.C.G.A § 15-11-58 (h) supported its findings; juvenile court’s placement of second child with paternal grandmother, vacated, because no evidence showed that grandmother’s qualifications were submitted prior to juvenile court’s custody decision; juvenile court erred in transferring custody of first child to father, after it specifically found that first child was not deprived, because in deprivation proceeding, juvenile court is only authorized to transfer custody of deprived child.

In the Interest of T.S., A11A0420 (06/16/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 1, 2011

Order returning temporary custody of children to DFACS for additional 12 months and authorizing DFACS to discontinue providing reunification services, vacated, and case remanded; evidence that child was abused was based on child’s out-of-court statements, which were inadmissible hearsay because government did not show that child available to testify as required by child-hearsay statute; although trial courts presumably do not consider inadmissible evidence, order extensively discussed and relied upon hearsay, and no admissible evidence supported trial court’s findings; any error in trial court’s dismissal of new deprivation charges not addressed because mother could not show any harm from dismissal.

In the Interest of A.T., A11A0495 (06/07/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, June 24, 2011

Order ruling that primary custody of parties’ child should be granted to father, affirmed, as trial court did not err in so ruling, based upon mother’s planned move to New York; mother visited New York with child and moved some of child’s belongings to New York, without receiving written authorization from trial court, despite trial court’s order providing that parties were not to remove child from state of Georgia during pendency of case without further written order from trial court; mother’s claim that trial court erred in failing to make written findings of fact regarding material change in circumstances justifying change in custody to father, rejected.

Gallo v. Kofler, S11A0185 (06/13/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, June 24, 2011

Increase in mother’s visitation with her two children, affirmed, as it did not exceed time of custody allowed to father and thus did not amount to de facto change of custody; trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting parties’ communication with each other and attendance at children’s extracurricular activities, as these provisions did not infringe upon father’s rights and were narrowly tailored conditions justified by evidence; father failed to show that trial court’s refusal to admit certain cumulative custody evaluation reports was harmful, or that trial court abused its discretion in considering totality of evidence; denial of father’s motion for supersedeas, affirmed, as trial court did not exceed its authority in exempting visitation provisions of final order from supersedeas even after father filed note of appeal.

Blackmore v. Blackmore, A11A1277; A11A1526 (10/07/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, October 21, 2011

Order modifying terms of appellant’s visitation rights, affirmed, as custody evaluation was proper in this case though the case originally involved visitation; parties were divorced and consented to joint legal and physical custody of children; appellee filed petition seeking to modify terms of appellant’s visitation; custody evaluator was assigned to case, and her findings were not to be distributed except with court’s permission; appellant called expert witness who admitted to having copy of custody evaluator’s report; trial court granted appellee’s petition to modify appellant’s visitation; trial court did not err in declining to declare a mistrial after guardian ad litem advised court in chambers about statements made by one child, while appellant was not there, since his attorney was present and made no objection at the time, attorney waited until guardian placed evidence on record in matter before objecting, guardian did not introduce unreported evidence in chambers, and appellant failed to support argument that guardian’s statements so prejudiced court that it could not have ruled properly; prohibiting appellant’s expert from testifying about the report did not violate appellant’s due process rights; expert’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not violated; appellant had no standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of expert, and expert consented to the court’s request to view file which contained unauthorized report; appellant properly held in contempt of court for allowing his expert to review the custody evaluator’s report; no error in denying appellant’s motion in limine to exclude from record portions of evaluator’s report that contained the children’s statements; to degree any statements could be considered hearsay, the courts have presumed to have disregarded it.

Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0262 (07/08/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 29, 2011

Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s  therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).

Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).

Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Judgment denying father’s motion to vacate judgment of divorce AFFIRMED, and judgment modifying father’s custody order, AFFIRMED; father’s contention that divorce court lacked jurisdiction based on residency of his children, whom he alleged resided in Ethiopia when divorce was filed and when divorce decreee was issued in 2006, was moot, since trial court entered 2010 custody modificaiton and parenting plan order, it was uncontested that children and their mother resided in Dekalb county then and father submitted himself to trial court’s personal jurisdcition when he filed his cusotdy modificaiton pleading and he appeared for hearing on same; father’s contention that trial court erred in failing to make jurisdictional findings regarding children’s home state in body of 2010 custody modificaiton and parenting plan on basis that Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiciton Act generally requires such findings, rejected, since there is no such authority where, as here, trial court did not decline jurisdiciton on basis of being inconvenient forum or stay matter because of another custody action in foreign jurisdiciton.

Wondium v. Getachew, S11A0647 (05/16/2011)

Final judgment and decree of divorce, AFFIRMED; evidence supported trial court’s award of primary physical cusotdy of parties’ child to wife, and trial court correctly avoided any presumption against wife’s anticipated relocation; wife had served as primary caregiver since child’s birth; wife had strong, loving relaionship with child; and husband, both before and during divorce proceedings, exhibted conduct casting doubt on his trustworthiness, truthfulness and judgement.

Reed v. Reed, S11A0052 (05/16/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 5/27/2011

Judgement modifying parties’ custody, child support and visitation and ruling that father was in contempt for failing to enroll parties’ son in Henry county school system as agreement incorporated into parties’ final divorce decree required, AFFIRMED; record supported trial court’s conclusion that father willfully failed to enroll his son in Henry county school system as  agreement required, particularly in light of his failure to communicate with child’s mother before moving child out of state and his failure to seek judicial reevaluation of custody based upon his planned move;  father’s contention that trial court ‘ “erred by relying on a facially invalid self-executing custody provision”‘ in parties agreement, REJECTED, as agreement included no such provision; father’s claim that agreement ‘ “effectively restricted him from establishing residence anyway other than Henry County” ‘ and constituted unlawful attempt to retain jurisdiction over child REJECTED, since agreement provided only that judicial reevaluation of custody would be triggered if father moved; issuance of final order modifying custody in separate action mooted father’s claim of error regarding trial court’s ex parte emergency order in contempt action; evidence supported trial court’s finding that father ‘ “fled with the child to an out-of-state undisclosed location and hid the child.  the father intentionally avoided contact with the mother for a significant amount of time;” ‘ record belied defendant’s contention that trial court concluded that defendant’s military assignment prevented him from providing stable home environment for the child.

Roberts v. Kinsey, A10A2122 (03/23/2011)

Fulton County Daily Report:  April 8, 2011

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award of findings authorized award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Francis-Rolle v. Harvey, A11A0357 (05/05/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 20, 2011