Denial of father’s contempt motion, affirmed, as trial court did not impermissibly modify parties’ prior divorce decree in holding that mother can use her custodial time with parties’ children in any way she deems appropriate; trial court merely clarified extent to which father’s decision-making authority with regard to children’s extracurricular activities can encroach upon mother’s custodial time.

Earle v. Earle, A11A1450 (10/18/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, November 4, 2011

Judgement modifying parties’ custody, child support and visitation and ruling that father was in contempt for failing to enroll parties’ son in Henry county school system as agreement incorporated into parties’ final divorce decree required, AFFIRMED; record supported trial court’s conclusion that father willfully failed to enroll his son in Henry county school system as  agreement required, particularly in light of his failure to communicate with child’s mother before moving child out of state and his failure to seek judicial reevaluation of custody based upon his planned move;  father’s contention that trial court ‘ “erred by relying on a facially invalid self-executing custody provision”‘ in parties agreement, REJECTED, as agreement included no such provision; father’s claim that agreement ‘ “effectively restricted him from establishing residence anyway other than Henry County” ‘ and constituted unlawful attempt to retain jurisdiction over child REJECTED, since agreement provided only that judicial reevaluation of custody would be triggered if father moved; issuance of final order modifying custody in separate action mooted father’s claim of error regarding trial court’s ex parte emergency order in contempt action; evidence supported trial court’s finding that father ‘ “fled with the child to an out-of-state undisclosed location and hid the child.  the father intentionally avoided contact with the mother for a significant amount of time;” ‘ record belied defendant’s contention that trial court concluded that defendant’s military assignment prevented him from providing stable home environment for the child.

Roberts v. Kinsey, A10A2122 (03/23/2011)

Fulton County Daily Report:  April 8, 2011

Trial court’s final judgment of divorce and order holding wife in contempt of temporary order, AFFIRMED;  evidence of parties’ assets as well trial court’s statement that it did not find wife’s testimony credible showed that trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing marital property; trial court did not err in failing to award wife attorneys’ fees because record showed that trial court properly considered relative financial positions of parties; wife’s argument that trial court erred at conclusion of trial in ordering her to pay $76K balance on line of credit she took out on parties’ marital residence because she had no notice that such order would be issued, REJECTED, as trial court informed parties that it was considering such order, and line of credit was significant part of trial; wife’s argument that trial court could not issue such order because order prohibiting-her from taking out line of credit in first place was part of former divorce action which was subsequently dismissed, also rejected; even if trial court erred by referring to prior order, trial court had discretion to issue current order because it heard evidence that wife had been dissipating significant marital asset without notice to husband; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, despite her testimony to contrary, that wife had ability to pay remaining $8K of the 76K ordered by trial court and holding her in contempt for failure to do so; trial court did not err in denying wife’s motion for findings of fact and conclusion of law because wife moved for findings of fact after entry of judgment, and case was not so complex as to make appellate review impossible without specific findings.

Hunter v. Hunter, S10F1792 (03/25/11).

Fulton County Daily Report (April 8, 2011)

Order lifting certain restrictions on visitation rights of mother AFFIRMED, as OCGA 19-9-3(b) authorized trial court to modify visitation rights during contempt proceeding; trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying terms of final judgment to allow mother to resume unsupervised visitation because no evidence showed that mother was present danger to children as she testified that since her visitation rights have been restricted based on her failure to demonstrate that someone had directly witnessed her give urine sample for certain test, she had been seeing physician specializing in addiction medicine and had provided him with urine samples for testing, and no evidence showed that she actually tested positive for drugs or alcohol during prior test or at any subsequent test.

Gildar v. Gildar, A11A0759 (06/01/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, (06/17/2011)

Trial court’s orders entered in post-divorce litigation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disapproved of therapist to whom mother took child; trial court DID NOT ERROR when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismssed contempt, visitation, and custotdy portions of mother’s petition and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismssed claims, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-9-24 (b); because Mother filed current petition for modification of child support 11 moths after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modification of child support, trial court DID NOT ERROR in dismissing portion of mother’s petition seeking modification of child support, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (K)(2); trial court DID NOT ERROR as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview chid’s thereapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s thereapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owned guardian ad litem because mother was not prevailing party, and no statue required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning share of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order; trial court DID NOT ABUSE its discreton in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiciton to deny mother’s motiuon to set asside ward of attorney’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees did not supplement, amend, lter, or modify that judgment; mother’s application for discretionary review of denial of her motion to set aside award of attorney’s fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) are involved, application for appeal is requiered when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-35(a).

Avren v. GArten, S11A0064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011

Trial court’s order holding husband in contempt for refusing to agree to Agreed Domestic Relations Order (ADRO) proposed by his former wife and interpreting their divorce decree to require that they divide husband’s military retirement benefits equally, REVERSED, and case remanded; divorce decree provided that when husband retired from military service, wife would be entitled to receive from his retirmenent benefits such amount as Navy required to be paid to her; after their divorce, both parties learned that Navy did not require retirment benefits be paid to ex-spouses, so wife proposed ADRO, which husband refused to sign, directing that she recieve 50% of martial portionof husband’s benefits; trial court erred in holding husband in contempt because party may not be held in contempt for violation of court order unless order informs him in definate terms as to duties therby imposed on him; trial court’s using contempt proceedings to substantially alter divorce decree, eschewing its plain language, amounted to unauthoized modificaiton of same; letter from husband’s counsel to husband containg wife’s proposed ADRO woul be admissible on remand and not subject to attorney-client privilege because contemporaneiously sent copy of letter to wife.

Morgan v. Morgan, S10A1365 (01/10/11).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  January 21, 2011

Order denying plaintiff’s petition for contempt, alleging that her ex-husband failed to pay arrearage of $14,740.01 in support for their minor child as their custody order required, REVERSED; trial court erred in ruling that only command stated in definite terms in parties’ 2001 child support order was that plaintiff would pay $75 in child support to defendant each month until their other minor child reached age of 18; parties’ 2001 order specifically set defendant’s child support obligation for child in plaintiff’s custody at $640.87 monthly and that command in order that plaintiff pay defendant $75 per month until other minor child reached age of 18 was clearly practical accommodation to recognize fact that defendant had primary custody of that child ‘ “in liew of exchang[ing] the support checks …in the mail,”‘ as $75 represented difference in support obligations of each party to other; case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and Court noted that plaintiff’s remaining enumerations of error were moot.

Woods v. Bradford,  S 10A0636 (11/08/2010), 10 FCDR 3587

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/19/2010.

Judgment particially REVERSED in ex-wife’s contempt action; trial court erred in holding ex-husband in contempt for relying on self-executing child support provision in parties’ divorce decree to reduce his support obligation when he had ex-wife’s consent for two children to live with him; provision in question provided that husband would pay monthly child support to wife for parties’ children while each child was lving at home with wife, Perry v. Perry 265 Ga. 186 (1995), allows for self-executing decrease of child support payments and ex-husband property relied on language of child support agreement as to parties’ eldest child; ex-husband’s failure to return parties’ middle child to ex-wife upon request warranted ruling of contempt, since she had primary physical custody and ultimate decision-making authority; trial court did not err in ordering return of middle child to ex-wife, but trial court should have calculated child support arrearage amount from time ex-husband lost consent to keep middle child, so order requiring husband to pay $8.4K in back child support for middle child, vacated, and case remanded for determination of proper amount in arrears; award of attorneys’ fees to ex-wife, vacated for reconsideration.

Tanner v. Morris, S10A1227 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3472.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Judgment REVERSED in Gowins v. Gary, 284 Ga. App. 370 (2007), as trial court lacked authority to hold father in contempt of court for failing to make child support payments, which accrued under parties’ private settlement agreement prior to its incorporation into April 2005 court judgment; trial court held that it could not hold father in contempt for failing to pay child support prior to April 2005 judgment and Court of Appeals REVERSED, holding that “when the settlement agreement was incorporated in the April 2005 judgment and Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “when the settlement agreement from the date it was executed in July 2002 became the support obligations awarded by the court.”