Trial Court’s order terminating father’s child support obligation with regard to his 18-year-old son for whom he had agreed to support until child ‘ “reaches the age of eighteen…; provided that if [the child] becomes eighteen years old while enrolled in and attending a secondary school on a full time basis, then the child support shall continue for [said child] until he has graduated from secondary school or reaches the age of twenty, whichever comes first,” ” reversed; once child enrolls in approved online courses in effort to graduate from secondary school, his online attendance constitutes attending school for the purposes of extending child support beyond child’s 18th birthday; further full-time  school does not require atendance during summer month, and thus trial court erred in determining that father’s child-support obligation terminated because child was not enrolled in and attednign school on full-time basis during summer after he turned 18; trial court was not required to base its determination concerning continuation of child support beyond child’s reaching 18 solely on whether child was enrolled in and atetending high school on his 18th birthday but on whether child reach majority while still engaged in pursuing secondary education.

Draughn v. Draugh, S10A1599, S10A1600 (03/07/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 18, 2011.

Final judgment and decree of divorce AFFIRMED; trial court did not err in considering husband’s K-1 income in its calculation of gross income for child support purposed, and it did not abuse its discretion in using average K-1 income over past three years rather than average calculated over longer period because statutory guidelines provide only that income from closely help corporation should be casefully reviewed when dtermining appropriate level of gross income to use in calculating child support; trial court properly considered husband’s fringe benefits, such as his company’s payment of his truck payment and expenses, cell phone and some meals and inlcuded them in his gross income because such benefits significantly reduced his personal living expenses; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireing that husband maintain life insurance, with sole beneficiary being trust for his child and wife anmed as trustee, in amount that exceeded his cumlative child support obligation because O.C. G. A. 19-6-34 (a) does not limit value of such insurance to future support obligation of parent; trial court did not exceed scope of O.C.G. A. 19-6-34 in ordering creation of trust or in declining to consider cost of life insurance premium in calculating husband’s child support obliation because evidence showed that husband’s company paid premiums; trial court did not err in requireing husband to pay entire cost of child’s medical insurance as well as uncovered medical expenses becuase trial court made adjustment to his presumptive amount of child support to account for such expenses; trial court did not err in awarding husnband possession of his company-owned truck and obligating him for any associated debts and ongoing expenses because trial court did not purport to chang any aspect of arrangement between husband and his company; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife 15K in attorneys’ fees because record indicated that in making award trial court considered relative financial positions of parties.

Simmons v. Simmons, S10F1818 (02/28/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying parties’ 2005 divorce decree by reducing father’s child support obligtion to $981.25 per month plus annual payment of 25 percent of any gross commissions or other income received above his $3,500 monthly base salary, vacated, 6-1, as trial court erred in including additional annual child support provision without making and applying necessary findings of fact set forth in O.C.G.A. 19-6-15(i)(1)(B); trial court’s construction was contrary to intent of child support guidelines to have each parent contribute to his or her pro rata share of child support and requirement that presumptive child support amount consist of sum certain, which may only be varied, if trial court specifically finds deviations supported by written findings of fact; statute’s plain language mandates that trial court follow child support guidelines by utilizing child support worksheet to arrive at presumptive amount, and that any amount above or below presumptive amount should be considered deviation; case remanded with direction for trial court to enter new order consistent with applicable statutory provisions.

Stowell v. Huguenard, S10A1700 (02/28/2011).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011

Final judgement and decree of divorce, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to amke deviation from amount of presumptive child support for couple’s only child based on award of joint physical and legal custody because trial court made express findgs reguarding approporiateness of presumptive child support amount, and because evidence showed that trial court’s failure to deviate did not deprive child or unjustly enrich wife; because evidence showed that husbnad had ingested drugs during child’s lifetime, trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that he be periodically drug tested; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody of child because trial court found both parents to be fit and proper, acknowledging that each parent had strengths and weaknesses, and other evidence, namely  fact that child had good relationship with each parent and each parent had adequate housing for child and could provide for child’s needs, supported award; trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding which parent would have decision-making authority on variety of subjects regarding child; trial court did not err in entering judgement and decree of divorce within 10 months of filing of complaint or in failing to adopt wife’s recollected versionof what transpired during hearing in favor of court reporter’s certified transcript. 

Willis II v. Willis, S10F1357 (01/24/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 2/4/2011.

Order denying plaintiff’s petition for contempt, alleging that her ex-husband failed to pay arrearage of $14,740.01 in support for their minor child as their custody order required, REVERSED; trial court erred in ruling that only command stated in definite terms in parties’ 2001 child support order was that plaintiff would pay $75 in child support to defendant each month until their other minor child reached age of 18; parties’ 2001 order specifically set defendant’s child support obligation for child in plaintiff’s custody at $640.87 monthly and that command in order that plaintiff pay defendant $75 per month until other minor child reached age of 18 was clearly practical accommodation to recognize fact that defendant had primary custody of that child ‘ “in liew of exchang[ing] the support checks …in the mail,”‘ as $75 represented difference in support obligations of each party to other; case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and Court noted that plaintiff’s remaining enumerations of error were moot.

Woods v. Bradford,  S 10A0636 (11/08/2010), 10 FCDR 3587

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/19/2010.

Judgment particially REVERSED in ex-wife’s contempt action; trial court erred in holding ex-husband in contempt for relying on self-executing child support provision in parties’ divorce decree to reduce his support obligation when he had ex-wife’s consent for two children to live with him; provision in question provided that husband would pay monthly child support to wife for parties’ children while each child was lving at home with wife, Perry v. Perry 265 Ga. 186 (1995), allows for self-executing decrease of child support payments and ex-husband property relied on language of child support agreement as to parties’ eldest child; ex-husband’s failure to return parties’ middle child to ex-wife upon request warranted ruling of contempt, since she had primary physical custody and ultimate decision-making authority; trial court did not err in ordering return of middle child to ex-wife, but trial court should have calculated child support arrearage amount from time ex-husband lost consent to keep middle child, so order requiring husband to pay $8.4K in back child support for middle child, vacated, and case remanded for determination of proper amount in arrears; award of attorneys’ fees to ex-wife, vacated for reconsideration.

Tanner v. Morris, S10A1227 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3472.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Judgement REVERSED in parties’ divorce case; undisputed evidence showed at least $18 difference in amount of child support set forth in parties’ separation agreement and amount mandated by child support guidelines, trial court’s order failed to set forth mandatory finding under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 for deviation from guidelines and wife’s voluntarily agreement to deviation could not chang this result; award of attorneys’ fees to husband following denial of wife’s motion for new trial/motion to set aside divorce decree, REVERSED, as fee award could not stand absent required findings of evidence of husband’s counsel’s work.

Holloway v. Holloway, S10F1417 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3471

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Downward modification of child support award as well as modification of visitation and parenting time, AFFIRMED, after father petitioned for modifications of both child custody and child support awards based on his becoming unemployed; trial court DID NOT ERR in failing to make its downward modification of child support in child support, and thus O.C.G.A. § 10-6-15 (j), did not apply to keep child support from accruing; trial court DID NOT ERR in inputing income to father, despite his involuntary unemployment, because evidence showed that he was unemployed for proplonged period of time and did not make significant effort to gain employment; no factual basis supported father’s argument that trial court relied on incorrect estimate of mother’s income, since mother’s financial affidavit included both salary and tips; trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to modify downward father’s obligation reguarding child’s medical and dental exprenses because trial court was not required to allocate parties’ share of child’s healthcare expenses at same rate as their share of child support award, and parties did not present evidence on subject to trial court; trial court did not err in failing to address father’s visitation suggestions because it determined that there was no evidence of material change in circumstances warranting medification of current custodial agreement.

Galvin v. Galvin, S10A1104 (11/01/10), 10 FCDR 3467

From:  Fulton Count Daily Report, 11/12/2010.

Judgement REVERSED in parties’ divorce case; undisputed evidence showed at least $18 difference in amount of child support set forth in parties’ separation agreement and amount mandated by child support guidelines, trial court’s order failed to set forth mandatory findings under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 for deviation from guidelines and wife’s voluntarily agreement to deviation could not change this result; award of attorneys’ fees to husband following denial of wife’s motion for new trial/motion to set aside divorce decree, REVERSED, as fee award could not stand absent required finds of fact and evidence of husbnad’s counsel’s work.