Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (j), reversed, as floor amount of child support provided in parties’ settlement agreement did not construe clear and express waiver of right of modification; parties’ decision not to include in their agreement well-worn waiver language set forth in Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (1978), or its equivalent, suggested that they did not intend to forbid statutory downward modification of husband’s child support obligation, even below floor amount.

Dean v. Dean, S11A0739 (09/12/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 23, 2011

Judgment of father’s petition for legitimation and visitation, partially vacated; absent transcript, record presumably supported trial court’s findings that custody and visitation decision was in child’s best interest, and evidence presumably supported trial court’s findings regarding child support; grant of $2.5K in attorneys’ fees to mother, vacated, and case remanded, as trial court’s order failed to specify any basis for award.

Charlot v. Goldwire, A11A0684 (07/01/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s  therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).

Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).

Fulton County Daily Report, May 27, 2011

Award of attorneys’ fees to mother, VACATED, and case remanded, but order establishing child custody, visitation and support, AFFIRMED; trial court did not err in failing to make findings of fact regarding alleged deviation based on zero income of mother because father failed to show that trial court made deviation that required findings of fact; trial court’s determination that mother had no monthly gross income and its decision to omit from Schedule D father’s cost of health insurance premiums, assumed correct, because father failed to include transcript of hearing in record on appeal, and father made no assertion that he was aggrieved by fact that Schedule D failed to set forth any amount for insurance premiums; trial court did not err in failing to make findings of fact with respect to adjustment for mother’s work related child care costs because evidence did not show that adjustment was deviation; finally, as mother conceded, trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact sufficient to support its award of attorney’s fees.

Kennedy v. Kennedy, A11A0427 (05/16/2011).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/3/2011)

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award of findings authorized award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Francis-Rolle v. Harvey, A11A0357 (05/05/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, May 20, 2011

Order granting father’s petition to modify child custody rights awarded to mother in parties’ prior divorce decree, PARTICIALLY REVERSED; mother’s claim of error in trial court’s custody award, DISMISSED, as child turned 18 shortly after instant appeal was docketed; trial court ERRED to extent that it required mother to pay child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. 19-6-15 (e), with no limit as to age, because financial assistance after child reaches age of majority but is still in secondary school is only required until child reaches age 20; trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to father, VACATED and case remanded, because original award of attorneys’ fees failed to include statutory basis for award or findings authorizing award, and no evidence showed that mother received proper notice or opportunity for hearing.

Trial Court’s order terminating father’s child support obligation with regard to his 18-year-old son for whom he had agreed to support until child ‘ “reaches the age of eighteen…; provided that if [the child] becomes eighteen years old while enrolled in and attending a secondary school on a full time basis, then the child support shall continue for [said child] until he has graduated from secondary school or reaches the age of twenty, whichever comes first,” ” reversed; once child enrolls in approved online courses in effort to graduate from secondary school, his online attendance constitutes attending school for the purposes of extending child support beyond child’s 18th birthday; further full-time  school does not require atendance during summer month, and thus trial court erred in determining that father’s child-support obligation terminated because child was not enrolled in and attednign school on full-time basis during summer after he turned 18; trial court was not required to base its determination concerning continuation of child support beyond child’s reaching 18 solely on whether child was enrolled in and atetending high school on his 18th birthday but on whether child reach majority while still engaged in pursuing secondary education.

Draughn v. Draugh, S10A1599, S10A1600 (03/07/11)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 18, 2011.

Final judgment and decree of divorce AFFIRMED; trial court did not err in considering husband’s K-1 income in its calculation of gross income for child support purposed, and it did not abuse its discretion in using average K-1 income over past three years rather than average calculated over longer period because statutory guidelines provide only that income from closely help corporation should be casefully reviewed when dtermining appropriate level of gross income to use in calculating child support; trial court properly considered husband’s fringe benefits, such as his company’s payment of his truck payment and expenses, cell phone and some meals and inlcuded them in his gross income because such benefits significantly reduced his personal living expenses; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireing that husband maintain life insurance, with sole beneficiary being trust for his child and wife anmed as trustee, in amount that exceeded his cumlative child support obligation because O.C. G. A. 19-6-34 (a) does not limit value of such insurance to future support obligation of parent; trial court did not exceed scope of O.C.G. A. 19-6-34 in ordering creation of trust or in declining to consider cost of life insurance premium in calculating husband’s child support obliation because evidence showed that husband’s company paid premiums; trial court did not err in requireing husband to pay entire cost of child’s medical insurance as well as uncovered medical expenses becuase trial court made adjustment to his presumptive amount of child support to account for such expenses; trial court did not err in awarding husnband possession of his company-owned truck and obligating him for any associated debts and ongoing expenses because trial court did not purport to chang any aspect of arrangement between husband and his company; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife 15K in attorneys’ fees because record indicated that in making award trial court considered relative financial positions of parties.

Simmons v. Simmons, S10F1818 (02/28/2011)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying parties’ 2005 divorce decree by reducing father’s child support obligtion to $981.25 per month plus annual payment of 25 percent of any gross commissions or other income received above his $3,500 monthly base salary, vacated, 6-1, as trial court erred in including additional annual child support provision without making and applying necessary findings of fact set forth in O.C.G.A. 19-6-15(i)(1)(B); trial court’s construction was contrary to intent of child support guidelines to have each parent contribute to his or her pro rata share of child support and requirement that presumptive child support amount consist of sum certain, which may only be varied, if trial court specifically finds deviations supported by written findings of fact; statute’s plain language mandates that trial court follow child support guidelines by utilizing child support worksheet to arrive at presumptive amount, and that any amount above or below presumptive amount should be considered deviation; case remanded with direction for trial court to enter new order consistent with applicable statutory provisions.

Stowell v. Huguenard, S10A1700 (02/28/2011).

From:  Fulton County Daily Report:  March 11, 2011.

Judgement modifying final divorce REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying decree in order that each ‘ “party shall pay fifity percent of all reasonable medical expenses not covered by the minor child’s medical insurance’ ” since parties settlement agreement specifically expressed that father was to be responsible and pay for all reaonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental and orthodontic expenses; trial court did not err in refusing to find father in contempt of his obligation under settlement agreement to provide health insurance for child, since trial court did not declare that obligation to provide health insurance did not exist or purport to relieve father of that obligation; trial court erred infailing to find father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to impose sanctions, since father admitted on cross examination that his counsel stipulated to amount of his arrearages and Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) did not deprive trial court of jurisdiciton over that matter as UIFSA provides that tribunal in Georgia issuing suppport order has continuing jurisdicion with respect to modificaiton of child support orders where, as here, mother and child reside in Georgia and no evidence exists that parties have filed written consents to allow another state’s tribunal to assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for failing to comply with obligation to refinance 1998 Jeep Cherokee, resulting in mother being liable for 15K in outstnding debt; trial court should address issue on remand that father was in contempt for failing to comply with privision requireing him to pay mother’s divorce attorney $3,750 in attorney’s fees; trial court erred in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating privision in settlement requireing him to maintian life insurance coverage in the amount of 130K; trail court should address on remand mother’s contention that father should be held in contempt for failing to pay $228.60 of child’s uninsured medical expenses; trial court did not err in ruling that father was not in contempt for violating his  obligation to provide medial and dental insurance for child; trial court did not err in finding mother in contempt of decree for severing telephonic communication between father and child; case remanded for futher proceedings reguarding denial of mother’smotion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

Baars v. Freeman, S10A1779

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, April 1, 2011