Creation of $250K trust to fund future child support payment, AFFIRMED:  Court had jurisdicion to consider father’s appeal, even though father filed his appeal outside of 30 days of trial court’s order, since certain details of trust were not specified and order contemplated further court action; trial court was authorized to create trust under OCGA 19-6-15, because statue provided for instances where trial court had discretion to deviate from child support table and statue as a  whole gives trial court broad discrtion when ruling on child support obligations; trust did not violate OCGA 9-5-6, which prevents creditiors without liens from enjoining debtors from disposing of property, ince some evidence showed that father wasted or mismanaged his assets and that he was in arrears several times with child support payments; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering trust that only benefited one of father’s children, because trial court considered other child support orders when it calculated support award, trust was fully funded by father’s 2007 an 2008 bonus money and trial court did not have authority to enter trust awards for any other child; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering $250K to be placed in trust, because it had discretion to create trust and father did not show any error in trail court’s calcautions.

Henry v. Bacham, A09A1129 (11/19/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (12/11/2009)

Ruling on contempt sanction partially reversed; trial court impermissiby modified divorce decree when it ordered ex-husband to pay his ex-wife $1875 in lieu of transferring one-half of his 401(K) account to her;  contempt order did not merely clarify 401(K) provision in divorce decree, but transmuted award into presently-due-cash obligation; ample evidence supported trial court’s finding that ex-wife did not willfully disobey divorce decree provision requiring her to leave marital residence – run-down mobile home – in same condition; trial court did not fail to consider parties’ financial circumstances in awarding ex-wife $1,200 in attorney’s fees for contempt proceeding but trial court should reconsider fees on remand and consider revising it in its discretion to extent it was based on 401(k) issue; ex-husband waived right to closing argument at contempt hearing when he failed to request it.

Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, S09A1137 (11/23/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (12/4/2009)

Grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss, REVERSED; when trial court considered matters outside pleadings, such as affidavits and testimony from underlying divorce proceedings, it converted motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment and plaintiff was entitled to hearing following his timely request.

Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, A09A1409 (10/30/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (11/30/2009)

GA Judgment PARTIALLY REVERSED on remand for consideration of attorney’s fees in parties’ divorce case, as trial court exceeded its discretion in modifying final divorce decree with regard to award to wife of percentage of parties’ retirement plans; final decree valued wife’s “retirement funds according to the date of transfer with-out any mention of specific dates” and valuation adopted by trial court on remand was contrary to final decree.

Leggette v. Leggette, S09A1503 (11/09/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (11/20/09)

GA Grant of wife’s motion to set aside default judgment in parties’ divorce case, AFFIRMED, under right for any reason rule; OCGA 19-5-8 prohibits default judgments in divorce, alimony and child custody actions.

Harold v. Harold, S09A1854 (11/09/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (11/20/2009)

GA judgment requiring father to pay $1,639 per month in child support, REVERSED, as trial court erred in failing to hold hearing prior to imposing discovery sanctions and sanctions were unduly severe; trial court excluded critical evidence and/or precluded father from making arguments that were critical to his case; trial court also erred in calculating father’s self-employment gross income, because trial court ignored father’s business expenses and other deductions and fact that he only owned one percent of shares in small construction and remodeling company.

Harrell v. Georgia Dept. f Human Reources ex rel. Harrell, A09A1886 (10/15/09)

From:  Fulton County Daily Report  (11/06/2009)

Order incarcerating appellant for contempt arising from her divorce decree, REVERSED, as trial court erred in incarcerating appellant based only upon letter from opposing counsel asserting that she had not complied with terms of trial court’s October 15, 2008 order – incarceration of contumacious party cannot depend upon mere averments of interested party; res judicata did not bar appellant’s appeal, because she appealed order entered subsequent to her prior appeal.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/16/09)

Bauman v. Humphries, A09A1096 (09/29/09), 09 FCDR 3185

Attorneys:  David Cole, Allen W. Bodiford

Judges:  Brian Amero, Henry Superior Court;  Blackburn, Boyle, Adams, Georgia Court of Appeals

Termination of father’s parental rights affirmed as clear and convincing evidence that incarcerated father sexually abused child supported it;

Court could address father’s constitutional challenge to OCGA 5-6-36 (a)(12), requiring decretionary appeals by application from orders terminating parental rights, rather than by direct appeal, even though father did not raise issue in trial court, since challenge fell within limited exception to general rule in instance of challenge to consitutionality of statue governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for first time on appeal;

5-16-35 (a)(12) did not deny father equal protection, since it does not treat similarly-situated individuals differently; individual subject to termination of parential rights cannot be equated to individual, who faces interruption of custody, since termination is much more severe measure;

Assuming arguendo that father demonstrated similarly-situated requirement, equal protection challenge still failed, since classification is reasonable and state has legitimate interest in not permitting children determined to be deprived to languish in temporary care, but instead, to leave this situation for permanent stable homes as expeditiously as possible, and discretionary appeal process helps accomplish this goal.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (12/16/09)

In re:  A.C., S09A0931 (10/05/09), 09 FCDR 3148

Attorney:  Phillip Jackson, Abdulhakim Saadiq, Tyrone M. Hodnett II

Judges:  Sanford J. Jones, Fulton Juvenile Court; Supreme Court of Georgia:  Hines

Dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s complaint and award of attorneys’ fees to defendant, VACATED, as res judicata did not bar plaintiff’s action; Court previously reversed grant of declratory judgment to defendant in McLeod v. Clements, A09A0632 (06/25/09), 09 FCDR 2226 (07/10/09), because plaintiff was not provided with statutory notice per OCGA 9-4-5, so declaratory judgment hearing and decision was nullity and there was no legitimate litigation of issues in first action; award of attorneys’ fees to defendant based on plaintiff’s’ “wanton disregard of the judicial process”‘ infiling second action was improper.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (10/09/09)

McLeod v. Clements, A09A1256 (09/21/09), 09 FCDR 3091

Attorneys:  R. Jerry McLeod (pre se), Stephen R. Sullivan

Judges: Richard M. Coward, Brooks Superior Court;  Georgia Court of Appeals:  Barnes, Miller, Andrews

A GA mother who suffers from a mood and personality disorders but is adverse to medication, does not comply with the goals of a reunification plan, fails to stabilize her volatility, and fails to maintain steady employment and stable housing, is evidence of a lack of parental care or control causing a child’s deprivation, the deprivation is likely to continue, and the deprivation is likely to cause the child serious harm.

Termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child when she has been in DFACS custody for all but eight of her 27 months.

Judicial notice of evidence, exhibits, testimony and unappealed court orders in an underlying deprivation proceedings in the same court is not an abuse of discretion when the parent was allowed to confront the witnesses.

Trail counsel is not deficient for stipulating to evidence admitted in prior deprivation proceedings.

In the Interest of S.N.H.   A09A0159 (08/18/09)

Judges:  Phyllis Miller, Gwinnett Juvenile Court;  Mikell, Johnson, Ellington.

For more information contact:  CJ Remboldt