Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (j), reversed, as floor amount of child support provided in parties’ settlement agreement did not construe clear and express waiver of right of modification; parties’ decision not to include in their agreement well-worn waiver language set forth in Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (1978), or its equivalent, suggested that they did not intend to forbid statutory downward modification of husband’s child support obligation, even below floor amount.

Dean v. Dean, S11A0739 (09/12/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 23, 2011

Dismissal of biological mother’s appeal from denial of her motion for new trial following grant of petition to terminate her parental rights, affirmed, as trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that mother’s failure to timely pursue filing of transcript or seek extension of time for almost one year was unreasonable and inexcusable; although mother argued that dismissal of appeal deprived her of due process because of significance of terminating her parental rights, Court held that need to reach final resolution expeditiously applied in such cases because children need permanence of home and emotional stability and should not be required to linger indefinitely in foster care.

In the Interest of T. H. , A11A1028 (08/26/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 9, 2011

Grant of wife’s petition for temporary family violence protective order against husband pursuant to Family Violence Act, affirmed, as any discrepancy between trial court’s oral pronouncements and written judgement must be resolved in favor of written judgment, and O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4 does not require that family violence protective order include written findings of fact and conclusions of law; record belied husband’s contention that trial court authorized wife’s attorney to decide amount of child support award, as standardized form order contained handwritten language and deletions made by trial court; trial court did not err in concluding that it had no authority to direct clerk of court to withhold transmission of family violence protective order to Georgia Protective Order Registry because language of O.C.G.A. § 19-13-53 (b) required such transmission, without exception, and trial court did not have discretion to convert family violence petition into civil restraining order in parties’ divorce action.

Birchby v. Carboy, A11A1355 (08/29/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, September 9, 2011

Judgment of father’s petition for legitimation and visitation, partially vacated; absent transcript, record presumably supported trial court’s findings that custody and visitation decision was in child’s best interest, and evidence presumably supported trial court’s findings regarding child support; grant of $2.5K in attorneys’ fees to mother, vacated, and case remanded, as trial court’s order failed to specify any basis for award.

Charlot v. Goldwire, A11A0684 (07/01/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Trial court’s determination in this action in equity that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing her equitable claim, affirmed; petitioner stated that alleged settlement agreement was supposed to have been incorporated in her divorce decree, but she failed to take any action to remedy that omission for 12 years, she took no action for five years after alleged pension payments became due but were not paid, she failed to act when payments she alleged were made under agreement were reduced in amount and paid only sporadically and she waited additional two years after alleged pension payments stopped altogether to bring this action seeking equitable relief in form of constructive trust.

Davis v. Davis, A10A2195 (07/06/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Finding that minor child was deprived, reversed; no clear and convincing evidence showed that mother was unfit to care for child; evidence that child was wearing only diaper during summer day, lack of variety of food in home, physical discipline of child, and dirty home did not support finding that child had been or would be harmed; additionally, no evidence showed that mother’s failure to accept support services harmed child.

In the Interest of J.H., A11A0125 (07/01/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Order removing child custody from mother and granting custody to father, reversed; trial court does not have authority to modify final order of custody during contempt proceeding; trial court should not have granted motion for service by publication because father’s statement that father checked telephone information and directories did not show that father exercised due diligence in attempting to contact mother; specifically, father had been instructed to mail information to mother’s former address and had mother’s phone number and email address; moreover, service by publication did not give mother notice that custody action was pending because notice only mentioned contempt action related to visitation.

Coker v. Moemeka, A11A0005 (07/01/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Nunc pro tunc order, affirmed, in divorce case, as trial court properly used such order to cause written judgment of divorce to relate back to date of original divorce hearing and ruling; on June 1, 2000, trial court issued final divorce decree, however decree was not filed with clerk until August 1, 2002 and meanwhile parties remarried on June 25, 2000; wife again filed for divorce on June 29, 2010, and at that time, parties learned that final decree in first divorce had not been filed until 2002; wife sought to amend 2000 judgment, husband sought to dismiss 2010 petition for divorce, and trial court amended order in 2000 case by entering order nunc pro tunc to ensure that it reflected true judgment rendered—that parties were to be divorced on June 1, 2000.

Maples v. Maples, S11F0919 (07/11/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 22, 2011

Order terminating mother’s parental rights, affirmed, as evidence supported it; specifically, evidence supported juvenile court’s determination that children were deprived because mother failed to appeal prior finding of deprivation, and conditions upon which that finding was based, namely mother’s lack of supervision and lack of insight into her parenting responsibility, still existed at termination hearing; evidence showing mother’s persistent failure to adequately supervise her children as well as her failure to demonstrate insight into her shortcomings, despite two interventions by DFACS and months of counseling, also supported juvenile court’s finding that cause of deprivation was likely to continue; finally, evidence—of harm the children already endured, that only after being provided intensive counseling did children demonstrate improvement, that upon return to mother, children lacked same medical and psychological care, and that their foster mother had bonded with them and wished to adopt them—supported juvenile court’s determination that continued deprivation was likely to cause harm to children.

In Interest of T.A.H., A11A0245 (06/16/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 1, 2011

Juvenile court’s order, reversed, to extent it awarded custody of first child to father, vacated, to the extent it found reunification was not in second child’s best interests and placed her with her paternal grandmother, and, affirmed to extent it found second child derived; juvenile court did not err in finding second child deprived because evidence showed that mother physically abused child on at least two occasions, police were notified on one of those occasions, mother pled guilty to simple battery, and mother’s psychologist testified that she believed it was unwise to return children to mother’s custody unless and until mother sought further psychiatric counseling; however, juvenile court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review on issue of whether reunification was not in second child’s best interest because it did not specify which, if any, of presumptions under O.C.G.A § 15-11-58 (h) supported its findings; juvenile court’s placement of second child with paternal grandmother, vacated, because no evidence showed that grandmother’s qualifications were submitted prior to juvenile court’s custody decision; juvenile court erred in transferring custody of first child to father, after it specifically found that first child was not deprived, because in deprivation proceeding, juvenile court is only authorized to transfer custody of deprived child.

In the Interest of T.S., A11A0420 (06/16/11)

Fulton County Daily Report, July 1, 2011