Lump-sum back-child support award against father VACATED, and case remanded for trial court to reconsider award in light of father’s annual income and his other child support obligations;  Weaver v. Chester, 195 Ga. App. 471 (1990), set custodial parent’s actual expenditures as ceiling or maximum for back-support award, but in no way set those expenditures as minimum for such award, and trial court must follow Child Support Guidelines, which include consideration of both parent’s income and their other child support obligations; evidence showed that father earned less than $27K per year, while child’s natural mother, father’s ex wife, erned nearly three time that amount, and father has five adopted children throughhis remarriage; mother’s testimony regarding her actual child-care expenses over 12 yers, of which she had personal knowledge, supported trial court’s finding that mother expended $83.6K for child-care during that time periold.

Smith v. Carter, A10A1760 (07/30/10), 10 FCDR 2674.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report

Judgment granting appellee’s petition for legitimation and awarding temporary custody of appellant’s child, first to appellee, then to appellee’s parents and then to appellee again, VACATED; trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition to legitimate, since no evidence was presented regarding issues necessary for determination of whether to grant legitimation at May 29, 2008, 30 Day Conference on appellee’s petition; for same reason, trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for temporary custody, since only mother is entitled to custody of child, until legitimation is properly entered; no authority grants legitimation by default; case remanded with direction for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ernst v. Snow, A10A0602 (07/13/10), 10 FCDR 2452

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 07/30/2010.

Judgment in this contempt case AFFIRMED; 21.9 acres, which surrounded parties’ 5-acre residential parcel, was not encompassed in their final judgment and divorce decree, and thus remained joint property; trial court did not improperly modify its decree, when it clarified that its reference in in decree to marital residence at stated address meant only 5-acre tract on which parties’ home sat, and not surrounding 21.9 acres, which parties also owned; appellant’s own actions belied his contention that marital residence described both tracts of land, since parties’ agreement provided that appellant would ‘
refinance the marital residence in his name only,”‘ which he did, refinancing debt on only 5-acre tract and its attendant house, appellant did not seek contempt citation until two years after appellee executed quitclaim deed to 5-acre tract, and he twice paid half taxes on 21.9-acre parcel, after appellant executed that deed; appellant’s contention that opinion in Messadi v. Messadi, 282 Ga. 126 (2007), stood for proposition that language, marital residence at stated address, required that term also encompass 21.9-acre tract on basis that it was never assigned street address different from that of lot upon which house sat, rejected, since fact that adjacent lot in Messaadi had separate address, and was not embraced by award of marital residence located at stated address, did not mean that use of term martial residence in concert with specific address would necessarily embrace separate lot when there not separate address.

Gonzales v. Crocket, S10A0452 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2066

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (07/09/2010.

Judgment, AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce action; record belied husband’s contention that terms of parties’ oral settlement agreement were still in dispute, since husband testified that he knew agreement would be set forth on record and did not object to any terms when wife’s attorney stated them on record and, thus, trial court did not err in finding that agreement existed between parties or in making agreement part of final decree; trial court did not abuse its discretion in DENYING husband’s request for attorney’s fees.

Sponsler v. Sponsler, S10F0299 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2064

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 07/09/2010.

Grant of father’s motion for upward modification of mother’s child support obligation, REVERSED, as evidence did not support trial court’s ruling that mother had ability or means to earn amount, which trial court found that she could earn per month and upon which it based award; it was undisputed that mother’s income and earning capacity ad dramatically decreased from what trial court notes and projected in 2005 order and from what she actually earned in 2006 and 2007; in 2008 mothers was earning $13 per hour for gross income of approximately $1.5K per month, of which $1K went towards her monthly day care bills,  her hours as office administrator for dental practice could not be increased due to economic turn down, and she could not pursue career selling real estate, because of depressed real estate market and her inability to fund out-of-pocket expenses required of real estate agent; no evidence showed that mother was willfully underemployed, or that she was voluntarily suppressing her income to avoid child support payments; evidence did not support finding that mother was not legally pursuing biological father of her illegitimate child for child support as means of suppressing her income; $2.5K attorneys’ fee award for father, REVERSED, as evidence did not support trial court’s determination that mother had ability to pay such amount; case remanded to trial court for entry of award, which evidence supports.

Herrin v. Herrin, S10A0384 (06/28/2010), 10 FCDR 2063

From:  Fulton County Daily Report, 07/09/2010.

Judgment AFFIRMED, in parties’ divorce case; trial court DID NOT ERR in awarding wife $200K in lump sum equitable property division, since evidence authorized jury to find that value of marital property exceeded that amount; $600K lump sum alimony award was not excessive, given evidence that husband owned more than $1.6M in property and that his gross monthly income exceeded $16.6K; husband failed to present evidence of his inability to pay property and alimony awards in timely fashion.

Wier v. Wier, S10F0553 (06/28/10), 10 FCDR 2062

From:  Fulton County Daily Report 7/9/2010

Judgment in parties’ divorce case, PARTIALLY REVERSED, and case REMANDED; final degree internally contradicted each party’s share of their minor child’s uninsured health case expenses, since test of decree required 61-39 percent split and incorporated child support addendum required 50-50 split; trial court erred in ordering husband to maintain minor child’s health insurance, without including that expense in calculating his child support obligation, since husband testified that his monthly heath premium would be $238, OCGA 19-6-15 (b)(6) requires proration of child care and health insurance expenses between parents in arriving at adjusted child support obligation and, under section (b)(7), trial court must modify adjusted child support obligation by factoring amount of health and child care expenses each parent actually pays; trial court did not abuse its discretion in requireingwife to pay half of loan balance as of date of divorce decree, rather than date of trial, even though trial court did not enter decree until 155 days after trial, since trial court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, and OCGA 15-6-21(a), which requires rulings on motion within 30 days after hearing in counties with less than 100K inhabitants applies only to motions for new trials, injunctions, demurrers, and all other motion, not to bench trials in divorce actions; trial court had discretion to order sale of parties’ residence and to account for how existing mortgage would be paid until sale; trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering husband to continue paying mortgage on marital residence, where he still resided, until he purchases home or it is sold; husband benefited from trial court’s omission of steps requiring pro ration of child care expenses under 19-6-15(b) because trial court order parents to split child care expenses equally and father’s pro rate share of expenses would have been 57&; trial court did not abuse its discretion in its visiation award.

Dupree v. Dupree, S10F0516 (06/07/2010), 10 FCDR 1824

Judgment and final divorce decree arising from parties’ common law marriage, AFFIRMED; Georgia recognizes valid common law marriages from other states, Alabama law applied with respect to common law marriage in this case and evidence, though conflicting, satisfied Alabama criteria for common law marriage; trial court did not err in admitting evidence of parties; conduct after they moved to Gerogia, since their cohabitation and public recognition of their marriage could corroborate other evidence of prior agreement to marry in Alabama; trial court lacked authority to credit appellant for his pre-trial payments of temporary alimony against final award; trial court had authority to enter October 22, 2009 judgment nunc pro tunc to April 7, 2009 and to order appellant’s monthly lump-sum alimony installments to begin on June 1, 2009 and, in any event, appellant benefitted from that order, since his monthly lump-sum payments were $500 less than his monthly temporary alimony payments; Courts had no jurisdiction to consider trial court’s December 1, 2009 contempt order, even if nunc pro tunc to November 19, 2009 provision of that order was proper, since trial court entered that order subsequent to final divorce decree and appellant’s enumeration regaruding contempt order was not redicated on proper and timely appeal.

Norman v. Ault, S10F0874 (06/07/2010), 10 FCDR 1821

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/18/2010)

Revision; judgment revered and case remanded;  Court had jurisdiction over mother’s appeal, even though appeal involved final divorce decree, which included child custody determination, rather than separate child custody order, since mother followed required application procedures for discretionary appeal; trial court had authority to revise custody award in this case beyond term in which trial court entered original custody decree, because father filed his motion for reconsideration within the term of court; however, trial court lacked authority to set aside its original custody determination without determining child’s best interests, regardless of whether mother was living with another man – mother contended that she and man in question did not live together prior to divorce and, since divorce, they had married and, at motion for reconsideration hearing, trial court simply followed its own policy of never awarding custody to parent living with non-relative.

Todd v. Todd, S10A0471 (06/01/2010), 10 FCDR 1754

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/11/2010)

Judgment increasing mother’s child support obligation, REVERSED, as trial court erred in modifying it without finding substantial change in mother’s income, since entry of final divorce decree; mother’s monthly income has decreased from $2.1K to $0, due to her decision to become a stay-at-home mother to her child from her new marriage, even if trial court correctly disregarded voluntary reduction in mother’s income, evidence did not show increase in mother’s income in 2 1/2 years since her divorce, and neither party presented evidence of mother’s husband’s income; trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to father under OCGA 19-9-3(g) and 19-6-15(K)(5), since father was not prevailing party, in light of fact that evidence did not support increase in child support award; evidnece did not support attorneys’ fee award under any statute, in any event, as father did not provide his attorney’s actual costs or reasonableness of those costs; trial court used correct standard of whether this was material change in condition affecting children’s well being in ruling that evidence supporte denial of mother’s petition for modification of custody; mother failed to show that father’s mother’s home was inadequate for their children, that father’s late shifts at work materially affected children’s welfare, or that allowing their daughter to finish out last six wweeks of her school year at her previous school, after father moved with children to his mother’s home, adversely affected her well-being.

Harris v. Williams, A10A0294 (06/11-2010), 10 FCDR 1918.

From:  Fulton County Daily Report (06/25/2010)